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Abstract 
This article is a comparative analysis of the effects of power structures on the 
success and/or failure of the water regimes in the Jordan River Basin and Euphrates 
Tigris River Basin. In order to see the differences and/or similarities between the 
two river basins, both of which are located in the same geographical region, regime 
theory is taken as the theoretical framework. The article contributes to the research 
on water in the Middle East in two ways: first, it analyses the role of domestic 
powers as well as global and regional powers on regime outcome; and second, it 
provides a basis for understanding why the riparians have chosen cooperative 
strategies in the Jordan Basin while in the Euphrates Tigris region temporary 
resolutions have been chosen. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In most water poor regions, access to water may draw the borderlines for relations 
among regional actors. As fresh water is vital for the livelihood of human beings, 
the struggle for access to and control over water resources has been a major cause of 
tensions among communities. Water that transcends state boundaries may lead to 
further complexities in terms of riparian relations and institutional limitations. The 
vitality of fresh water, accompanied with the water scarcities in water poor regions, 
makes hydro-politics among riparian states one of the most complex issues in 
international relations. 
Given the environmental security dimension of transboundary water issues, two 
different approaches have been used to explain them. On the one hand, some 
scholars like Gleick (1993) and Homer-Dixon (1994) stress the likelihood of violent 
conflicts arising over water resources. On the other hand, scholars like Wolf (1998) 
focus on the likelihood of cooperation over water resources based on empirical 
evidence. As far as empirical records are concerned, in spite of the potential for 
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tensions in shared river basins, the record of acute conflict is overwhelmed by the 
record of cooperation. According to the Oregon State University’s Transboundary 
Freshwater Dispute Database, in the last fifty years, just thirty-seven acute 
conflicts have occurred, while 150 water treaties were negotiated and signed.1 That 
is to say, cooperation rather than conflict is the rule in transboundary water 
relations.  
According to Elhance (1999) when studying conflict or cooperation in river basins, 
a number of factors should be taken into consideration. First of all, the hydrology of 
a river basin paves the way for interdependencies among riparians in terms of 
politics, environment and security. The physical geography is one of the 
denominators that determines the nature and degree of dependence of each riparian 
on the shared river as well as the urgency of the need for cooperation. Although 
states tend to exploit the water resources that flow within their territories, 
hydrological interdependencies in the basin gradually force them to find 
compromised solutions and cooperate over shared waters. In addition to 
hydrological interdependencies, the riparian structure of the basin constitutes 
another important aspect of riparian relations. Within this context, physical 
geography plays a substantial role in defining bargaining powers of the riparians as 
well as their power position in the basin (Elhance 1999). In most cases, upstream 
states exploit the waters of rivers that flow through international borders. Thus, this 
exploitation may negatively affect the quality and quantity of waters available to 
downstream states. Particularly in the absence of a basin wide agreement, upstream 
states can alter the flow and, consequently, downstream states can suffer from low 
levels of quality and quantity of water. In spite of the importance of being upstream, 
the relative power of the riparians also influences hydropolitics in the basin. Thus, 
hegemons in the river systems can play important roles in defining the basics of 
basin wide agreements in favour of their own interests.  
As water is a shared resource and a public good, it must be considered as a common 
property resource which is supplied jointly and which no party within the river basin 
can be excluded access to. But in practice, states are reluctant to share control over 
the rivers that flow within their borders. In order to maximize their gains, states tend 
to exploit transnational water resources unilaterally. States’ unilateral actions in 
international river basins have constituted a challenge for basin wide solutions to 
protect this common property resource and enhance the benefits to all. As 
experienced in the Middle East river basins, scarcity is not the main reason for 
worsening disputes. Rather, unilateral actions such as dam construction or river 
diversion in the absence of an agreement, lead to destabilization of the basin. 
                                              
1 Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database is available at: < http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu>. 
IJIS Volume 3
BEZEN BALAMIR COSKUN – POWER STRUCTURES IN REGIME FORMATION 
 
3  
According to Postel and Wolf (2001:61), “the red flag for water-related tension 
between countries is not water stress per se but rather a unilateral attempt to develop 
an international river, usually by a regional power.” 
The Middle East is one of the most water poor regions and has the world’s lowest 
per capita water consumption. As the climate is largely arid with average annual 
rainfall levels of less than 250 mm/year, annual water supply in the region is not 
reliable. Thus, the region suffers from acute water scarcities. Consequently, 
hydropolitics in the Middle East have been characterized by intense and 
occasionally armed hostility since the second half of the 20th century.  
Until the 1940s the regional economies were regarded as water secure with enough 
water to meet domestic and industrial demands. But parallel with increasing 
population rates, the use of fresh water increased six-fold over half a century.   
Water has therefore become one of the vital security issues among water poor 
Middle Eastern states (Allan 2002). Furthermore, the policy of food security and 
self-reliance as a national economic goal for most of the regional governments has 
caused over use of water in irrigation. Over 70% of water supplies in the region are 
used for irrigation. In spite of the poor economic returns, these agricultural policies 
have been pursued as a primary political objective, making water resources 
extremely valuable for governments. Within this context, for most of the Middle 
Eastern governments national security translates into food security, and food 
security translates into water security (Morris 1997). Therefore, the allocation of 
water resources that transcends boundaries (e.g. Euphrates, Tigris, Nile, Jordan, 
Yarmuk etc.) has become one of the sources of inter-state tensions. The main factors 
that might fuel these water related tensions are: rapidly growing populations, 
economic development, increasing living standards, technological developments, 
political fragmentation and poor water management. These factors, accompanied 
with inadequacy of international water laws, can lead to an escalation of conflict in 
the region over shared water resources (Drake 2000). Most of the riparian 
governments face common water problems which can be either the incentive for 
further tensions or an impetus towards regional cooperation in order to overcome 
political, social and economical problems. Within this context, in spite of the 
growing water demand the Middle East has not experienced any significant war 
over water resources with the exception of some minor military events in the Jordan 
Valley in the early 1960s. 
In this article two of the conflict-prone water basins, Euphrates Tigris and Jordan 
Basins both located in the Middle East, will be examined and compared in order to 
analyze the role of power structures and actors other than the state on water regime 
formations. The overall goal is to analyze the power structures and actors that have 
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affected the regime outcome in two different but overlapping regional river basins. 
Within this context, possible answers to the following questions will be sought:  
In what ways do regime formation outcomes in the Euphrates Tigris and 
Jordan River Basins differ from each other?  
How do global, regional and domestic power structures affect the processes 
and outcomes of water regime formations in the two river basins?  
The first part of the article presents regime theory and regime formation arguments 
as the main theoretical framework. The second part of the article consists of a 
comparative analysis of the cooperative efforts and respective agreements in the 
two river basins. In addition, the role of power structures will be assessed vis-à-vis 
their impacts on water regime formations.  
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES AND WATER REGIMES 
One of the main characteristics of the contemporary globalised international system 
is the high level of interdependence among international actors. Keohane and Nye 
(1989) define situations characterized by reciprocal effects among international 
actors as interdependence in world politics. According to Keohane and Nye, 
interdependence affects state behaviour and policies. Within this context, new 
procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of activity have been created in 
order to regulate and control transnational and interstate relations. In general, these 
cooperative efforts are called international regimes.  
Regime theory provides a tool for explaining international cooperation in the 
presumed anarchic international system. The consensus definition of international 
regime was elaborated by Stephen Krasner and is defined as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1991:2). According to Krasner (1991) regimes are not regarded as ends in 
themselves; rather they affect related behaviour and outcomes. In an international 
system, based on the idea of sovereign states, the main function of regimes is to 
coordinate state behaviour in order to achieve desired outcomes. Within this context 
the major function of international regimes is to facilitate mutually beneficial 
agreements among governments (Keohane 1991).  
With regard to international watercourses, the concept of water regimes has been 
attracting more and more attention. Water regimes refer to the constrained 
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mechanisms that guide the actions of parties in a river basin (Jagerskog 2001:4). For 
Hafterdorn, water regimes come into existence “when affected states to a conflict 
observe a set of rules designed to reduce conflict caused by use, pollution or 
division of a water resource or the reduction of the standing costs and the 
observance over time of these rules” (Hafterdorn 2000:65). Hafterdorn 
distinguishes between regimes that are established to deal with all future water 
conflicts, like the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses, and water regimes that are connected to a particular 
conflict.  
In general, the conceptualisation of international regimes is rooted in the 
conventional definition of international politics and refers to relations between 
sovereign actors who pursue self-preserved policies. Thus, the outcomes emerging 
from the interactions of states, which can range from war to cooperation, are the 
reflections of states’ interests and preferences (Stein 1991). The realist school, 
however, argues that conflict is the dominant outcome in terms of relations among 
self-interested international actors. International regimes are thus an anomaly from 
this standpoint (Keohane 1991). Within this context, the logic and impetuses behind 
the formation of regimes requires examination. 
REGIME FORMATION  
According to Keohane (1991) and Stein (1991), international regime formation 
relies on rational-choice analysis. Stein argues that  
…the same forces of autonomously calculated self-interest that lie at the 
root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundation for 
international regimes. …[T]here are times when rational self-interested 
calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in 
favour of joint decision making (Stein 1991:132). 
With this formulation, Stein presumes the existence of interdependence which 
makes mutual expectations very important.  
An international system is characterized by independent self-interested 
decision-making. According to Stein, there is no need for a regime if there is no 
conflict between interests of the states. However, if all the actors have an incentive 
to avoid independent decision-making, self-interested calculations would pave the 
way to joint decision making since independent self-interested behaviour might 
result in undesirable outcomes. Stein defines these situations as dilemmas of 
common interests. According to Stein, in order to solve the dilemma of common 
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interests individual actors have to come together to form an international regime. 
As far as international collective goods are concerned, optimal provision can be 
assured only if states abstain from independent decision-making. Otherwise, 
independent decision-making leads them to be free riders and results in either the 
sub-optimal provision or the non-provision of collective goods (Stein 1991). 
The tragedy of the commons is the best example of the dilemma of common 
interests and the necessary collaboration to move from the sub-optimal equilibrium. 
The commons are open to all and the tragedy is the overgrazing that resulted from 
unrestrained individual use. Each actor most prefers to be the only user of the 
common source, followed by joint restraint in the mutual use of the good, and least 
prefers a situation in which his or her own restraint is met by the others’ lack of 
restraint. Each actor prefers to share the resource rather than to see their own 
restraint allowing either the continued existence of the resource for others’ use or 
the disappearance of the resource because of others’ unrestricted usage. “The actors 
have a common interest in moving from their sub-optimal (but not least preferred) 
outcome to one in which they exercise mutual restraint by collaboratively managing 
the resource” (Stein 1991:129). In a nutshell, regimes arise when actors give up 
independent decision making in order to deal with the dilemmas of common 
interests for the sake of their own self-interests.  
As far as the structural basis of regimes is concerned, the distribution of power 
among relevant actors shapes the structural characteristic of a regime. Young (1991) 
defines three different paths to regime forms: 1) spontaneous, in which regimes 
emerge from converging expectations; 2) negotiated, in which regimes are formed 
by agreements; and 3) imposed, in which regimes are forced by external powers. 
Among these formation shifts, imposed regimes are the most sensitive to shifts in 
the division of power within the international system since they are most closely 
tied with the power structures. 
Regime theory proposes that cooperation will bring better payoffs. However, 
real-world cases of international cooperation cannot be regarded as being initiated 
in a spontaneous manner. Instead, strong leadership tends to initiate international 
cooperation in many cases.  In all types of regime formation, power plays a vital 
role. In many cases, a hegemon plays the role of a "facilitator” for international 
cooperation and works synergistically for better solutions for all member countries 
within the system (Min 2003). Most often, hegemonic powers use their powers to 
sustain a regime that promotes their interests, or they may veto the formation of a 
regime that challenges their interests. In terms of sub-systemic regimes, hegemonic 
powers can structure the choices and preferences of less powerful actors and shape 
regional outcomes.  
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Keohane (1984) takes the concept of benevolent hegemony and incorporates it as 
the starting point of his regime theory. According to Keohane, the hegemon is a 
leader who reinforces cooperation among actors to produce symbiotic effects in 
collective actions. Although he shares the liberal argumentation proposing the 
possibility of non-hegemonic cooperation, his concept of benevolent hegemony is 
inspired by the realist argument of accepting the hegemonic role for maintaining the 
stability of the international system. However, for Keohane hegemony is not a 
sufficient condition for international cooperation. Keohane focuses on state 
decisions rather than on power capabilities and argues that the legitimate nature of 
hegemony is founded upon the consent of non-hegemonic states. According to him, 
hegemony is distinguished by its “willingness to sacrifice tangible short-term 
benefits for intangible long-term gains” (Keohane 1984:45). On the other hand, in 
the coercive version of the hegemonic stability theory, a hegemon is understood as a 
utility-maximizer that coerces or extracts subordinate countries as much as possible. 
One of the major characteristics of coercive hegemony is the hegemon’s forceful 
action toward other countries in the system. Thus, a “rational” hegemon extracts 
available resources from others in addition to providing international public goods 
for systemic purposes (Min 2003). According to Gilpin (1981), states seek optimum 
combinations of power and welfare. Therefore, the systemic behaviour of a 
hegemon or other states can be explained by the expected utility calculated by these 
actors. Furthermore, he argues that international systems are changed by states that 
receive positive expected benefits exceeding expected costs from the change.  
In addition to the influence of hegemons, the power relations among actors within a 
sub-system should be taken into consideration. Both in the formation and 
continuation of a regime, interdependency among actors and the vulnerability of 
actors towards others’ actions within the system also play major roles. In other 
words, both the sub-systemic and global power structures can affect the nature of 
the regime, and the regime in turn governs the political bargaining and 
decision-making within the system (Keohane and Nye 1989). 
In general, regime theory is criticized for neglecting domestic politics. This neglect 
of domestic politics poses limitations for understanding cooperation among 
international actors. In order to understand the reasons behind states’ cooperative or 
non-cooperative actions or policies in the international system, the domestic 
political context needs to be examined since foreign policies are mainly reflections 
of domestic interests. Particularly in security issues, the perceptions of elites play a 
major role while in economic issues, the internal distribution of the costs and 
benefits of international policies plays the major role. Thus, the tendency to ignore 
domestic politics has caused deficiencies in explanations of the security and 
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economic policies of individual states since, in most cases, the internal character of 
states and elites is one of the central elements in determining state preferences.  
Consideration of domestic politics is, hence, essential for understanding 
international cooperation for three reasons: First, domestic politics shows how 
preferences are aggregated and national interests constructed; second, domestic 
politics help to explain the strategies that are adopted by the state in order to realize 
the goals; and third, domestic politics are essential to ratify international agreements 
and cooperation documents (Milner 1992). 
Krasner and Katzenstein (1978) focus on structural factors as domestic 
determinants of foreign policy. Both authors state that central decision-makers (i.e. 
the state) must be concerned simultaneously with domestic and international 
pressures. Furthermore, according to Putnam: 
…a more adequate account of the domestic determinants of foreign policy 
and international relations must stress politics: parties, social classes, 
interest groups (both economic and non-economic), legislators, and even 
public opinion and elections, not simply executive officials and 
institutional arrangements (Putnam 1993:435).  
In light of the importance of domestic politics, Putnam uses the “two-level game” 
metaphor:  
At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring 
the government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power 
by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, 
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign 
developments (Putnam 1993:436).  
Thus, governments should be in line with their respective domestic interests for 
pursuing international policies. Since regime formation is part of international 
policies of a particular government, as far as regime formation is concerned, 
domestic politics absolutely do matter. In order to explain the interaction between 
domestic politics and regime formation, Zurn takes Krasner’s conceptualisation of 
regimes as “intervening variables” between the “basic causal variables” and “the 
observable related behaviour” and identifies basic causal variables as “domestic 
politics” (Zurn 1993). 
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WATER REGIMES IN THE JORDAN AND EUPHRATES TIGRIS RIVER 
BASINS 
Since the second half of the 1990s, relations between riparians in both the Jordan 
River Basin and the Euphrates River Basin have been dominated by peaceful 
resolution of disputes. This is contrary to the general view that both basins are 
conflict-prone and, therefore, it is likely that water will lead to conflicts. In the 
Jordan Basin agreements for settling water distribution disputes were signed and 
Joint Water Committees (JWC) were initiated. However, in the Euphrates Tigris 
region relations between the Turkish and Syrian governments are getting more 
cooperative and friendly. In the following section, the tendency towards 
cooperation and/or resolution of tensions in the Jordan and the Euphrates Tigris 
River Basins will be analysed within the framework of regime theory.   
Since the independence of the Arab states and the foundation of the State of Israel, 
wars and/or armed conflicts between Arabs and the Israelis have been a part of the 
relations among Jordan riparians. By contrast, among the Euphrates Tigris riparian 
states the only war between riparians was the Iran-Iraq war. 
As opposed to the assumption that freshwater conflicts are the significant 
determinant of riparian tensions, in reality the main reasons behind most of the 
wars/armed conflicts in both river basins are political disputes involving territorial 
disputes, ethnic rivalries, nationalism or regional hegemony. Although water 
security has been considered as an indispensable part of national security by the 
riparian states’ governments, freshwater has not been the only reason for conflicts 
or tensions between riparians in both basins. The only real war over water resources 
was the Six Days War (1967) in the region. In most cases, the impact of political 
tension between riparians is a significant component in freshwater conflict 
escalation, as experienced between Israel and its Arab neighbours since their 
independence.  
In the Euphrates Tigris Basin, water has not been one of the determinants of state 
ideology and, therefore, water related tensions were not experienced between 
riparians in the initial periods of state building in the basin. On the other hand, 
access to water resources was one of the significant determinants of the Zionist 
ideology which paved the way for Israel’s occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip 
and the Golan Heights to strengthen its hydro-strategic position in the basin. Given 
the importance of the water, especially for Jordan and the Palestinians, Israel’s de 
facto confiscation of water resources has always been a highly contentious and 
tension-ridden issue in the Jordan Basin.   
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In spite of the general assumption that war/armed conflict over water resources is 
inevitable in the Jordan Basin, particularly between Jordan and Israel, there have 
been ongoing efforts since the 1950s to form a kind of water regime between the 
two states. As a result of the interdependence between Jordan and Israel and their 
dependency on water resources, formation of some procedures, rules, or institutions 
was inevitable in order to regulate and control their relations. In this sense, the 
formation of a water regime between Israel and Jordan can be considered as part of 
the rational-choice analysis of the two states, both of which decided to abandon 
independent decision making in favour of joint decision making in accordance with 
their rational self-interested calculations. In spite of the conflictual policies and 
unilateral projects of Jordan and Israel in terms of the water diversion from the 
Yarmouk and Jordan Rivers, with the 1994 Peace Agreement both countries 
accepted that the individually preferred outcome is neither accessible nor stable. 
Therefore, in order to reach an optimal outcome they decided to review their 
dominant strategies.  
The case of Jordan and Israel may be considered as a water regime created to solve 
the dilemma of common interests. As regimes established to deal with the dilemma 
of common interests require collaboration, the water regime between Israel and 
Jordan specifies the rules for allocation, storage and protection within the Annex II 
of the Israel Jordan Peace Treaty.2 Furthermore, as a part of collaboration efforts, a 
JWC was formed in order to implement and monitor the principles agreed upon. In 
spite of agreement on the principles with regard to common water resources, the 
regime has been limited in its effectiveness due to political disputes between Israel 
and Jordan that have forced them into non-compliance of these rules at times 
(Jagerskog 2003). 
Although control over and access to water resources is one of the basic conflictual 
issues between Israel and the Palestinian Authority, it was the first issue agreed 
upon by the two conflicting parties. Since the establishment of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO) Palestine has not been recognized as a state, which 
caused Israel and Jordan’s rejection of Palestine as a co-riparian. Until the 1995 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, 3  Palestinians were considered as a 
population under the occupied territories of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in 
spite of the Palestinian Authority’s claims on water rights within the framework of 
the principle of the absolute territorial sovereignty. Unlike its equal position with 
Jordan as a sovereign state, in the Palestinian case, Israel is considered as the owner 
                                              
2 Treaty of Peace Between The State Of Israel And The Hashemite Kingdom Of Jordan (1994) Available from: 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa.go.asp?MFAH00pa0>. 
3  The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (1995) Available from: 
<http://www.us-israel.org/jsource/Peace/iaannex3.html#app-40>. 
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and the provider of water supplies for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. At the 
beginning of the negotiation process, both Israel and Palestine started with 
contradictory claims and assumptions on the water issue. However, during the 
negotiations both sides compromised their claims and, by the end, found an optimal 
point for agreement even though this did not serve all their self-interested demands. 
In spite of its favourable position, Israel was forced to agree on an optimum 
resolution over the water issue, which is an integral part of the interim agreement 
within the framework of the Middle East Peace Process initiated by the United 
States. By signing the interim agreement, Israel accepted the Palestinians’ water 
rights to some reasonable degree. In order to facilitate the water allocation issues 
and water related projects and improve the efficiency of water systems especially in 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a JWC was established between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority. Despite some exogenous challenges and a slow 
decision-making mechanism, the cooperation has continued (Jagerskog 2003).  
In both cases, there is a power asymmetry between the sides. According to Keohane 
and Nye (1989), asymmetrical interdependence can be a source of bargaining power 
in favour of the ones who have control over resources or the potential to affect 
outcomes. As experienced in the negotiations between Jordan and Israel, Jordan 
was not in a strong position with regards to control over water. As a result, Jordan 
tended to negotiate with Israel in order to guarantee an optimum share and to 
prevent further conflicts with Israel. On the other hand, as a less dependent and 
more powerful actor, Israel was the leading actor during negotiation. Because of 
this, any changes in the existing regime will most likely be less costly for Israel than 
Jordan. As far as Palestine is concerned, although it is the weakest actor in the basin, 
during negotiations Palestine had the international community’s support for its case 
against Israel. However, changes in the existing regime will more likely cause 
significant harm to the Palestinians since Israel still has the power to control water 
supplies in the Palestinian settlements. 
Compared with the Jordan Basin, in the Euphrates Tigris Basin no significant 
tensions have been experienced apart from some diplomatic tensions or verbal 
threats, since none of the riparians are as vulnerable in terms of water shortage. The 
conflicts in both basins are mainly distributional conflicts. However, the main 
reason for tensions in the Jordan Basin is absolute shortage, whereas in the 
Euphrates Tigris it is relative shortage (Hafterdorn 2000). Major tensions among 
riparians started with the unilateral dam construction projects of Turkey and Syria. 
Turkey’s Greater Anatolia Project (GAP)4 was perceived by Syria and Iraq as a 
                                              
4 Since the late 1960s, Turkish governments have initiated a series of water development projects in the Southeast 
Anatolia region known as the Greater Anatolia Project (GAP). After the 1980s, the GAP transformed from a 
largely hydroelectric project to an integrated regional development program. The GAP is a multi-sector and 
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threat to their water quantity and quality – Syria was accused by Iraq of reducing 
waters as a result of the Al Thawra Dam. The tensions between Iraq and Syria were 
not long lasting, whereas the tensions between Turkey on the one hand and Iraq and 
Syria on the other continued until the end of the 1990s. Recently the tensions among 
riparians have been simply frozen. Thus, it is likely to exacerbate new tensions. Iran 
has generally stayed out of the basin-wide tensions and resolution efforts because of 
its water-sufficient position and its regional marginalization.  
Unlike the Jordan Basin, in the Euphrates Tigris there are no stable alliances among 
riparians. In the basin, alliances among riparians have been contingently formed. 
These unreliable alliances and lack of trust among riparians has prevented the 
formation of a water regime in any real sense in the basin. As opposed to the 
Israel-Jordan and Israel-Palestine cases, until now no water regime has formed 
between the Euphrates Tigris riparians. Attempts have been made to resolve water 
related tensions and disputes between Turkey-Syria and Turkey-Iraq through 
bilateral agreements as well as Turkey’s unilateral initiatives to release more water 
in order to prevent accusations and ensure international financing in building its 
dams as experienced in 1965 (Keban Dam), 1976 (Karakaya Dam) and 1990 
(Ataturk Dam). 
In spite of the formation of the Joint Technical Committee (JTC), this committee 
and its agreements cannot go beyond data sharing and water allocation discussions. 
In this respect, the agreements between Turkey-Syria or between Syria-Iraq are just 
“one-shot” agreements with no regime in place to facilitate these arrangements. 
According to Keohane and Nye (1989), regime governed behaviour must be beyond 
short-term interests. In order to establish a regime, states should accept reciprocity 
and sacrifice short-term interests with the expectation that other actors will 
reciprocate in the future. Within this context, the only possibility for a regime 
formation would be if Syria and Iraq accepted Turkey’s Three Staged Plan.5 But 
neither Syria nor Iraq is inclined to accept the plan since the logic behind the plan is 
not compatible with their claims.  
                                                                                                                                                           
integrated regional development program that encompasses irrigation, hydraulic energy, agriculture, rural and 
urban infrastructure, forestry, education and health sectors. The water resources development dimension of the 
project consists of the construction of twenty-two dams and nineteen hydraulic power plants as well as the 
irrigation of 1.7 million hectares of land. In this regard, some of the basic strategies of the project are 
environmental protection, employment generation, spatial planning and infrastructure development (GAP 
Administration 2002). 
5 This plan is Turkey’s proposal for optimisation of the use of freshwater resources based on the ideas of integrated 
development and management of an international watercourse system for the maximum possible benefit for all the 
riparian states. 
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The main reason behind the failure of the formation of a water regime between the 
Euphrates Tigris riparians is that water scarcity in the Basin is not so acute and 
riparians are not below water stress limits like the Jordan Basin riparians. As a result 
of the relative abundance of renewable water resources compared to the Jordan 
Basin, the significant consequences of “the tragedy of commons” have not been felt 
yet. Therefore, the riparians have not felt any urgency to form a water regime in 
order to improve water resources collectively or agree upon efficient ways of using 
the water resources. Still, self-interested policies overwhelm the collective goods 
and sustainability.  
POWER STRUCTURES IN THE WATER REGIME: FORMATIONS OF THE 
JORDAN AND EUPHRATES TIGRIS BASINS 
According to Keohane and Nye (1989), regimes are intermediating factors between 
international power structures and political bargaining. Thus, both the failure or 
success and the nature of the regime are affected by the structure of the system and 
the distribution of power among states. Furthermore, as far as regimes are 
concerned, the perceptions of elites and the internal distribution of costs and 
benefits of international policies play significant roles both in the formation and 
continuation of the regime.  Thus, domestic politics is essential for understanding 
cooperation among international actors.  
Even though cooperation will bring better payoffs for the relevant actors, 
cooperation among international actors cannot be initiated in a spontaneous manner. 
In most cases of regime formation, a powerful regional actor or global hegemon 
takes on a facilitator role for international cooperation and regime formation.  
The Middle East has always been one of the regions that grabs the global hegemon’s 
attention. Especially after the end of the Cold War within the context of a new 
international order project promoted by the United States, the region has started to 
gain importance. In accordance with the assessments and contingency plans of the 
region, US policies have focused on the Persian Gulf due to the largest recoverable 
deposits of crude oil in the region. As a result of its importance for the US economy, 
the United States has engaged with the region through two channels: initiating the 
Middle East Peace Process between the Arabs and the Israelis; and pursuing a 
containment policy towards Iraq and Iran, as both countries have posed threats to 
US interests in the region.  
In the region which covers all the Jordan and Euphrates Tigris riparians, the United 
States has used its powers in two different directions in terms of regime formations. 
On the one hand, while it has maintained pro-Israel policies and its general support 
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of Israel before the international community, since the 1990s the United States has 
used its power to form water regimes in the Jordan Basin as a part of the peace 
process. On the other hand, it has pursued policies of divide and rule among the 
Euphrates Tigris Basin riparians which have prevented cooperation over the water 
resources. This is in contrast to Keohane’s assumption (1984) that the hegemon is a 
leader who reinforces cooperation among countries to produce symbiotic effects in 
collective actions. In order to contain the Iraqi threat to maximizing its utility in 
terms of regional oil resources, the United States has coerced Turkey and Syria as 
well as other regional states in the region to take a stand against Iraq under the 
banner of providing regional stability and security for the sake of the international 
system. However, unlike its coercive policies in the Euphrates Tigris Basin, in the 
Jordan Basin the United States has pursued more benevolent policies based upon 
the consent of non-hegemonic states as experienced during the negotiations. In this 
sense, the hegemonic intervention for the formation of the water regimes between 
Jordan and Israel and between Israel and the Interim Palestinian Authority was 
significantly important in addition to the riparians’ own consent to the agreement as 
a reflection of the rational choices of all three riparians.  
In addition to the effects of global power structure in terms of the hegemonic 
power’s influence on the formation of the water regimes, the power relations among 
actors within the river basins should be taken into consideration. According to 
Keohane and Nye (1989), both in the formation and continuation of a regime 
interdependency among actors and the vulnerability of actors towards others’ 
actions within the system also play major roles. Physical geography plays a 
substantial role in defining bargaining powers of the riparians as well as their power 
position in the basin. However, in addition to the importance of being the upstream 
riparian the relative power of the riparians also influences the hydropolitics in the 
basin.  
In the Euphrates Tigris Basin among Syria, Iraq and Turkey, Turkey is the most 
powerful country both in terms of control over water resources and in terms of 
political and military power. Turkey’s close alliance with the United States as a 
NATO member has been a protection shield against possible threats from its eastern 
neighbours. Even during its conflict with Kurdish separatist groups, tensions with 
Syria or Iraq never turned into armed conflicts as a result of Turkey’s relative 
military power and alliance with the United States. As for Iraq, since the Iran-Iraq 
war, Iraq’s military power has been deprived and, as a result of ongoing wars, Iraq’s 
water systems and infrastructure have been severely damaged. Furthermore, after 
the “Operation Iraqi Freedom” the Iraqi government lost sovereignty over its 
national resources including water. Until elections are held, an interim government 
rules the country but major projects for improving natural resources are mainly 
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coordinated by the coalition powers. Moreover, with the GAP project, Syria and 
Iraq are alienated from Turkey. Thus, the GAP has left them in a relatively weak 
position. As a result, Iraq has felt that it is at the mercy of Turkey and Syria, both of 
which have the power to prevent Iraq from obtaining enough water. Syria also has 
felt uneasy since, once Turkey completes the GAP, it will have power over both its 
neighbours thereby putting Syria in a merciful position. As a result of this 
asymmetrical power structure, Syria and Iraq have pursued non-cooperative 
policies and rejected Turkish proposals for unitary management of the Basin, 
thereby preventing the formation of a water regime in the Basin.   
By contrast, in the Jordan Basin, Israel is in the most favourable position even 
though it is a downstream riparian. As previously mentioned, by occupying the 
Golan Heights and the West Bank, Israel strengthened its hydro-strategic position in 
the region and has the uppermost position thanks to its military power. Furthermore, 
as a result of its economic power, Israel is able to implement projects for water 
resources development, whereas other economically weak riparians have 
difficulties finalizing their projects with regards to efficiency of water resources. On 
the other hand, their lack of ability to finance water development projects together 
with Israel’s economic power can stimulate development of multilateral projects on 
the shared rivers. Overall in the Jordan Basin, as a result of the powerful position of 
Israel and vulnerable position of Jordan and Palestine, Israel has played a leading 
role in defining the basics of the water regimes both with Jordan and Palestine.  
The most interesting commonality between Turkey and Israel is their close alliances 
with the United States, although their power positions with the United States are 
slightly different in terms of bargaining power. Israel has more bargaining power 
with the US because of the existence of a powerful Jewish lobby in the United 
States, whereas Turkey is more like a follower in terms of its relations with the 
United States. However, Israel’s and Turkey’s power positions in the region differ 
vis-à-vis the international communities’ perceptions. In the Jordan River Basin, 
Israel has been perceived as an “occupier” and has been accused of pursuing hostile 
policies toward its Arab neighbours, particularly toward Palestinians. On the other 
hand, in the Euphrates Tigris Basin, Iraq, Iran and Syria have been labelled as rough 
states particularly by the United States. Of the three, only Turkey is regarded as a 
state respectful of international norms and rules.  The US policies against Iraq, Iran 
and Syria, including embargoes on all three countries and operations against Iraq, 
have caused marginalisation of the three riparians and led to serious damages to the 
relations among the Euphrates Tigris Basin riparians, not only in terms of water 
regime formation but all kinds of cooperation efforts in the Basin.   
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In addition to regional power structures, domestic determinants of foreign policy 
are also among the significant dimensions of regime formation in both Basins. As 
far as the Jordan and Euphrates Tigris Basins are concerned, state characteristics 
and government structures in both basins have repercussions on riparian policies 
with regard to water resources. In both basins, most of the riparian states have 
authoritative governments except Turkey and Israel which have relatively populist 
regimes and democratically elected governments. As a consequence of the 
democratic system, popularity of the policies is more important for the Turkish and 
Israeli governments than for the authoritarian governments of the other riparians. 
However, interest groups are an integral part of political life for all riparians 
whether they are authoritarian or not. Thus, interest groups create some impact on 
policy decisions of all riparian states with regard to water resources.   
In the Turkish case, one of the main reasons behind the unilateral implementation of 
the GAP (a move that prevents water regime formation in the Basin) in spite of other 
riparian’s objections, is the interests of the political elite seeking popular support for 
their political rule. Therefore, the GAP serves the electoral purposes of the ruling 
parties. According to Carkoglu and Eder, the GAP has a political rationale with two 
dimensions:  
…the first is the political potential that the region offers for parties to 
utilize the traditional patronage linkages in implementation of the project 
in order to mobilize electoral support behind the parties in power. The 
second concerns national security and integration of the region to the rest 
of the country (Carkoglu and Eder 2001:51). 
Furthermore, as previously discussed, the GAP is a very significant project for 
Turkey because of the government’s long-term expectation that by implementing 
this huge development project it will be able to resolve the social and economic 
basis of the “Kurdish Problem” in the region. Evidently, both dimensions reveal a 
preoccupation with domestic political concerns even though the second one relates 
to international interactions within the framework of national security. Within this 
context, the political rationale behind the project has been influential on Turkey’s 
relations with Syria and Iraq.  
For Israel, domestic interest groups have been playing significant roles. On the one 
hand, settlers and right wing political parties have influenced Israeli arguments over 
water allocation issues with Jordan and Palestine during negotiation processes in 
order to prevent the Israeli government from completely withdrawing from the 
occupied territories without guaranteeing secure and adequate freshwater sources 
for Israel (Elhance 1999). On the other hand, as far as the Israeli government’s 
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internal policies with regard to water allocation from the agricultural sector to 
industrial and domestic sectors are concerned, the policies can be implemented 
easier now than in the previous period, since the political influence of the 
agriculture and irrigation lobbies have been declining substantially. In Israel, 
interest groups must be taken into consideration both in terms of national water 
policies such as reducing water allocation to agriculture, introduction of strict 
cost-based water-pricing policies for irrigation etc., and in terms of foreign policies 
with regard to hydropolitics.  
In spite of the relative power of authoritarian governments, interests groups, 
particularly bureaucrats and farmers, can be very influential on national water 
policies especially in Jordan and Syria.  Given the importance of agriculture for 
state economies, in Jordan and in Syria water charges are mainly maintained at low 
levels in order to diminish costs in the agriculture sector. However, the need for 
water policy reform in both states, which includes re-allocation of water from 
irrigated agriculture to industry in order to improve economic efficiency, has caused 
some social problems. Demand management, including population growth control, 
economic restructuring, supply redistribution and water conservation techniques, is 
needed for both Syria and Jordan. But as for Syria, the value of agriculture is beyond 
its economic value. As stated by Naff (1994)6 agriculture is culturally embedded, 
highly symbolic, and politically and militarily significant in Syria as in many other 
developing countries. Within this context, it is not easy to implement radical 
demand management policies in Syria and Jordan in spite of the power of the 
governments.  
Unlike Turkey and Israel, domestic interests groups in Syria and Jordan are not so 
influential on the governments’ foreign policies with regard to water regimes. The 
only probable link with domestic interests and the water related policies of the state 
vis-à-vis their relations with Israel is the given importance of food security and the 
importance of water resources for irrigated agriculture. Within this context, it may 
be presumed that agricultural interests are among the main denominators of the 
national water policies of these states.    
As far as Iraq is concerned, under the Ba’th regime national security issues and 
political interests of the state elites overwhelmed the interests of lesser groups as 
evidenced in the drainage of marshlands. The Iraqi government simply ignored the 
importance of the marshlands for the livelihood of Marsh Arabs, who had no power 
to oppose this project, and implemented the drainage project.  
                                              
6 Naff as quoted by Marwa Doudy (1999-2000: Web document). 
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Both in the Jordan and the Euphrates Tigris cases, different domestic power 
structures have impacts on hydropolitics and water regime formation in the basins 
in different forms. For the most part, riparian governments and their policies are 
more or less in line with their respective domestic interests.  
As far as water regime formations are concerned, all riparian states of the two 
Basins have proved Putnam’s two-level game metaphor. On the one hand, at the 
national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring their 
governments to adopt favourable water policies, and politicians in turn seek power 
by satisfying their needs. On the other hand, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures while minimizing the 
adverse consequences of water regime formations.  
CONCLUSION 
This article began with the assumption that water regime formation is not a 
spontaneous process despite the obvious advantages and better payoffs of 
cooperation for the riparians. In order to initiate the formation of a regime, a 
facilitator or strong leadership is needed. The main stimulus behind the positive 
outcomes of the Israeli-Jordan and Israeli-Palestinian agreements over water 
allocation issues was the role of the US as a benevolent hegemon and “facilitator” 
for the resolution of conflicts among the riparians.  At the same time, the main 
obstacle for water regime formation in the Euphrates Tigris is the US as a coercive 
hegemon. In both cases, the US as global hegemon has structured the choices and 
preferences of the riparians and shaped regional outcomes, but in different ways.  
A second assumption with regard to the role of global and regional power structures 
on water regimes was that the country positioned upstream in the basin could be 
more influential on hydropolitics. However, in addition to the importance of being 
upstream the relative power of the riparians in the region was also seen to be a 
significant denominator. Moreover, both Turkey’s and Israel’s relations and close 
alliances with the US must be taken into consideration when evaluating their 
dominant positions in the Basins. It can therefore be proposed that when evaluating 
the role of power structures in regime formation, the relevant actors’ relations with 
the hegemon vis-à-vis the hegemon’s perception of each actor must also be 
considered.  
In sum, the argument that power both global and regional plays a vital role in all 
types of regime formation was illustrated in both cases. However, Keohane’s 
assumption of the benevolent hegemon was challenged by the Euphrates Tigris case 
where the hegemon was shown to be coercive.  
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As regime theory’s neglect of domestic politics poses limitation for understanding 
cooperation among international actors, this article considered domestic interests 
and their effects on decision making in water regime formation in order to more 
fully understand the reasons behind states’ cooperative or non-cooperative actions 
or policies in the international system. 
The role of domestic influences on the outcomes of cooperative efforts and conflict 
resolutions were analysed in the Jordan and Euphrates Tigris Basins. Within this 
context the general assumption was that domestic actors, like NGOs, firms, elites 
and so on, have influence on governments’ decisions with regard to water regime 
formations. However, throughout the research, no evidence of any significant 
influence by NGOs or the business sector could be found. This is because in most of 
the riparian states the water sector is coordinated by the State, and civil society is 
not very powerful in comparison to the State. It was shown that domestic pressures 
come mainly from political elites who want to strengthen their power to rule, and 
from farming interest groups considered to be at the foundation of the national 
economies of most of the riparian states. Besides the general argumentation on the 
role of domestic politics, it is also worth noting that government regime types also 
have significant repercussions on regime formation. However overall, both the 
Jordan River Basin and the Euphrates Tigris River Basin cases prove Putnam’s 
two-level game metaphor, which puts emphasis on the role of domestic group 
interests on government policies and actions with regard to regime outcome.  
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Abstract 
In recent decades, environmentalism has gained strength and importance in various 
arenas. The introduction of sustainable development brought the environment into 
mainstream development and economic thought. However, there continues to be 
environmental degradation around the world and poor and marginalised 
communities often bear the brunt of environmentally harmful production processes. 
A concurrent movement of environmentalism is that of environmental justice, which 
has been utilised and strengthened by locally-based environmental movements in 
the Third World. This article uses a political ecology perspective to examine the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) in Nigeria and highlights 
the broad range of issues involved in Third World environmental problems. The 
relevance of the environmental justice movement as a critique of sustainable 
development and the direction of the global environmental movement are explored 
through this case study. 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF A GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 
Although today environmental issues permeate our everyday lives, it was not long 
ago that a resilient environment and plentiful natural resources were taken for 
granted. In many ways, it has been the rise of an environmental movement over the 
past several decades that has changed this view. Since its origins, the environmental 
movement has grown and evolved in many respects: from the actors involved, to its 
root causes and ultimate aims. Though concern for the environment has been 
present since the early stages of the industrial revolution, it only began to take its 
form as a social movement, and hence a growing force in mainstream thought, in the 
1960s with such manifestations as the founding of World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 
1961 and the publishing of Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring in 1962. The inception of 
the environmental movement was primarily a critique of “technocratic society” and 
of “the dominant values of consumer culture” (Jamison 2001:16). In this way, 
                                              
∗ All authors are current students of the Master’s degree program at the Research Center on Development and 
International Relations, Aalborg University. 
IJIS Volume 3
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2005) 
 
 
24 
issues of pollution, environmental degradation and waste disposal made their way 
into the public sphere.  
In the 1970s, the environment took the global stage in Stockholm at the United 
Nations’ Conference on the Human Environment. The resulting declaration 
emphasized such issues as under-development and over-population as key 
contributors to environmental degradation, not just industrialization. It encouraged 
the careful use of natural resources and the implementation of scientific knowledge 
and technology toward improving the environment (UN 1972). Thus, the 
interdependence of the environment and development was established and 
environmental problems became an issue of international concern (Dovie 2002). 
In 1973 the oil crisis struck and there was an additional focal shift in the movement 
to energy issues, especially to the controversial use of nuclear energy. This 
contributed to a greater politicisation of environmentalism. The emergence of green 
political parties, new environmental laws and the establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States indicated a growing 
recognition of the problem of the environment in political circles (Jamison 2001). 
With the 1980s came a diversification and a resulting diffusion of the movement. 
Environmental experts and activists became more specialized in their goals and 
strategies. In addition, the new push for neo-liberal policies and free market 
economics led to the reorientation of environmental issues from a social and 
political emphasis to that of an economic and commercial one (Ibid.). In 1987, the 
World Commission on Environment and Development published the Brundtland 
Report, Our Common Future. It was this publication that popularised the term 
“sustainable development” defined as “development that meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (WCED 1987:8). With the increasing use of this concept, environmental 
policy became inextricably linked to economic growth.  
As the 1990s arrived and progressed, fundamental changes were occurring in the 
environmental movement. This was evident at the United Nations’ Conference on 
the Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Rio 
conference, also called the Earth Summit, embraced the idea of sustainable 
development and set forth a global agenda of international governance and 
responsibility for the environment’s welfare. Rio confirmed the position of the 
environment on the global political agenda and “helped establish environmental 
management as a duty of governments worldwide” (Sachs 2002:10). In addition, the 
Rio declaration emphasized the responsibility of businesses and corporations in 
improving environmental conditions and practices (UN 1992). This suggests an 
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increasing privatisation and decentralization of environmental policies, and the 
subsequent incorporation of ecology into a capitalist mode of production (Jamison 
2001).   
However, with the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) just two 
years later, it became clear that the priorities of governments worldwide did not lie 
with the environment but with corporate access to natural resources and a 
neo-liberal agenda. Sachs (2002) highlights three major impacts of neo-liberal 
globalisation: The expansion of economic growth to the South following the same 
unsustainable path as that in the already industrialized countries; open markets 
resulting in increased natural resource exploitation in the South; and the pressures 
of the world market leading to a prioritising of commercial interests of private 
actors over the protection of public goods. In other words, as the Third World 
struggles to develop and “catch up” to the industrialized North, they are prone to 
follow the same destructive path that allowed the North to reach its current state of 
development. Furthermore, as “green” policies are incorporated in the North, there 
has been a “geographical displacement of sources and sinks” (Martinez-Alier 
2002:10) such that the environmentally harmful phases of production are shifted to 
the South. As a result, despite the apparent achievements at the Earth Summit, the 
trend has been increasing environmental degradation and no, or negative, economic 
growth in the South.  
In 2002, representatives of government, business and civil society reconvened at the 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg. The aim 
was to look back on the agreements reached at the Rio Conference ten years 
previously and to reflect on and reassess the results, or lack thereof, of those 
accomplishments. The summit recognized that the high hopes and expectations 
coming out of Rio were not matched in practice and implementation in the years 
that followed. In fact, it was acknowledged that the levels of environmental 
degradation had not slowed and that poverty had in fact increased in many regions. 
The summit at Johannesburg, for this reason, did not focus on renegotiating the 
terms of the Rio agreements but rather on finding ways to more concretely 
implement and act on these agreements. Priorities, targets and timetables were set 
and many partnership initiatives were formed between governments, NGOs, 
intergovernmental organizations and the private sector. Poverty reduction and its 
link to success in sustainable development was a key factor at the summit. Other 
specific priority areas included water and sanitation, energy, health, agriculture and 
biodiversity. In addition, emphasis was placed on integrating sustainable 
development into systems of global economics, international trade and finance (UN 
2002a).  
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The results of WSSD will be evaluated over the coming years. Participation and 
interest in the summit were high with 104 world leaders present and over 21,000 
other participants including 9000 delegates, 8000 NGOs, and 4000 members of the 
press. The Plan of Implementation outlined the action plan to fight poverty and 
environmental degradation not only detailing what has to be done, but also who will 
do it. Furthermore, many monetary commitments were made by industrialized 
countries around the world to such areas as sustainable agriculture, biodiversity 
protection, water sanitation and energy initiatives (UN 2002b). Overall, 
implementation efforts will be largely carried out at the local, national and regional 
levels and primary responsibility for carrying out these plans will fall to the 
governments.  
If nothing else, the Johannesburg summit demonstrated the importance and urgency 
of environmental issues around the world. It also indicated a growing interest of 
governments and the private sector in protecting the environment and its natural 
resources. However, whether this interest will outweigh that in economic growth at 
the cost of the environment remains to be seen. 
While sustainable development has taken on a dominant position in the global 
environmental movement, continuing environmental problems have led to 
alternative discourses. For example, in recent years, there has been an additional 
current of environmentalism that has emphasized human rights. This environmental 
justice movement emerged from the recognition of inequality in access to resources 
and disproportionate effects of land degradation and pollution on poor and 
marginalized groups. The environmental justice movement originated within the 
civil rights movement in the United States in the 1960s, when poor and minority 
communities were subjected to environmental discrimination in such forms as 
pollution and unsafe working conditions (Bullard 2003). Since then, the causes of 
communities in the Third World have also been taken up.  Environmental NGOs 
such as Greenpeace, Rainforest Action Network and Sierra Club have become 
increasingly involved in human rights campaigns and have helped to bring 
international attention to environmental justice issues around the world. With 
increasing capacity for communications and networking, local movements and 
international organizations continue to work toward internationalising their efforts 
(Clark 2002). 
The environmental justice organizations have, in many ways, integrated into the 
larger environmental movement. According to Al Gedicks (as quoted in Clark 
2002): 
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Until quite recently, native peoples have had to defend themselves against 
multi-national corporations and nation-states using their own very limited 
resources and with hardly any notice from the rest of the world. The 
situation has radically changed over the past decade. The integral 
connections between native survival and environmental protection have 
become apparent to even the most conservative environmental 
organizations (p. 434). 
However, the origin and focus of the environmental justice movement are decidedly 
different from those of the more mainstream movement. The environmental justice 
movement originates from a struggle for rights and livelihood by those groups 
whose very survival depends on the health of their environment. Since these groups 
are usually marginalized and have little access to political and economic resources, 
their environments may be exploited by the state or transnational corporations 
(TNCs) without compensation to local communities. These groups mobilize to 
confront the state and a capitalist-driven society to regain control of their land and 
resources allowing their livelihoods and cultures to persist (Ibid.). 
This is a very different perspective from that of the dominant global view of 
sustainable development. The Earth Summit exemplifies the incorporation of 
developmentalism into mainstream environmentalism. The answer to problems of 
poverty and resultant environmental degradation has been economic growth, but 
instead of solving problems, this strategy has resulted in social polarization and the 
dissolution of subsistence communities. While the early phases of the 
environmental movement recognized the impact of development on people and 
nature, as demonstrated by Rachel Carson, the recent trend has been an attempt to 
incorporate development into a seemingly contradictory rhetoric on the 
environment (Sachs 1995). What is left of this early environmentalism has grown 
out of a different foundation than the previous First World context. Now the 
emergence of a movement that questions the logic of sustainable development has 
arisen largely from those communities in the Third World that see a healthy 
environment as more critical to their survival than the often destructive economic 
growth strategies encouraged by the global development discourse.  
The disparities between global efforts against environmental degradation and 
poverty and the reality of these issues around the world lead us to question the 
direction of the environmental movement. The purpose of this article is to try to 
better understand Third World environmental problems and how social movements 
have arisen from these problems to contribute to and take advantage of the 
environmental justice discourse. This understanding helps to determine how the 
global environmental movement can be better directed and suited to the Third 
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World experience. Political ecology is the guiding theoretical perspective utilized in 
this article. This holistic approach is well-suited to examining the complexities of 
environmental movements in the Third World and is described further below. 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL ECOLOGY  
As discussed above, there has been an emergence in recent decades of a global 
environmentalism that has taken on an economically-driven and 
development-oriented approach to curbing environmental decline and resource 
depletion. In contradiction to these aims, environmental degradation continues and 
we have seen an increasing marginalisation of those most negatively affected by 
resource exploitation and displacement of environmentally harmful phases of 
production. The resistance movements that arise in reaction to this process, 
particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa and other parts of the Third World, are an 
attempt by local communities to regain control and access to local resources and 
hence a means of livelihood and survival. These movements play a critical role in 
redefining discourse and redirecting the motivations and actions of organizations at 
various levels of the development project. In order to better understand the role of 
the Third World environmental movement in shaping this global discourse, the 
Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People in Nigeria is taken as a case study, and 
its interaction with global discourses on the environment is examined. A political 
ecology perspective is used to understand the relationship between the various 
actors involved in the movement, including local populations, the Nigerian 
government and Shell Corporation.  
Political ecology has been defined as “the study of social conflicts over the access 
to, and the destruction of, environmental resources and services” (Martinez-Alier 
2002: 15). It is a recently evolved discipline that finds its roots in several schools of 
thought. The field grew out of a 1960s critique of neo-Malthusian thought and its 
claims of runaway population growth linked to environmental degradation. In 
linking human activities to environmental destruction and proposing political 
prescriptions to solve the crisis, the neo-Malthusians merged politics and ecology 
but were criticized for being overly grounded in “simple organic analogies” and 
lacking empirical data that demonstrated the crux of their thesis (Peet and Watts 
1996:4). Blaikie and Brookfield’s (1987) foundational text, Land Degradation and 
Society, contributed strength to the critique by highlighting the importance of 
marginality, pressure of production and the role of different perceptions of 
“environment” in the human-environment relationship.  
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In the 1970s, political ecology theory took on a more neo-Marxian perspective. 
Stemming from the fields of political economy and cultural ecology, scholars 
sought a more radical perspective and found this in the then popular Marxist school 
of thought. According to Bryant and Bailey (1997:13), “neo-Marxism offered a 
means to link local social oppression and environmental degradation to wider 
political and economic concerns relating to production questions”. Critiques of 
neo-Marxism noted its overly structural and sometimes simplistic nature in which 
the role of local politics was minimized and the potentially important role of weak 
actors in resistance to strong actors like the state was downplayed. This led in the 
late 1980s to a more complex understanding of power relations in the 
human-environment interaction as discussed further below (Ibid.). In the 1990s, 
political ecology began to develop “more nuanced characterizations of the social 
and cultural identities that influence humans’ roles in environment dynamics” 
(Paulson et al. 2003:208). This differed from earlier work that tended to view people 
as “land managers” and as objects of scrutiny that were more or less apolitical. 
Today, political ecology considers such cultural, social and political factors as 
gender, ethnicity, governance, and resistance as central issues to environmental 
knowledge and practice (Ibid.).  
The various challenges and criticisms faced by political ecology during its 
development has paved the way for recent debates centred around the issue of 
politics as it relates to the environment (Ibid.). It is within the realm of political 
economy that the element of power relates socially to the interaction of humans with 
their environment. The concept of power is an important one in political ecology. 
Power is defined as the ability of an actor to control their own environment and the 
environment of others. Control in this sense may be exerted directly over access to 
resources or location of pollution and waste disposal sites. In addition, control may 
be exerted indirectly in the regulation of ideas that pertain to how the environment 
should be used and treated. Power plays an important role in Third World 
environmental movements such as that examined in this article. It is perceived and 
utilized differently by different actors: whereas strong actors use power as a tool to 
exploit resources and to minimize the costs of environmental degradation, weak 
actors use power for resistance and defence of livelihood (Bryant and Bailey 1997). 
As discussed below, MOSOP is a struggle for access to resources and control of the 
environment and involves multiple actors with different levels of political, 
economic and social power.   
With its focus on power, political ecology tends to emphasize the social structure of 
such categories as class, ethnicity and gender. As seen with Bullard’s work with 
inequality in environmental justice for example, these factors play an important role 
in environmental issues. However, political ecology has often been criticized for its 
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overly structural nature (Paulson et al. 2003; Bryant and Bailey 1997). Hence, the 
importance of such post-structural concepts as culture, values and ideas, as well as 
how these ideas are developed and understood, must also be examined (Escobar 
1996). According to Paulson et al. (2003:206), an important aspect of political 
ecology is “the recognition of a plurality of positions, perceptions, interests, and 
rationalities in relation to the environment—an awareness that one person’s profit 
may be another’s toxic dump”. It considers the various discourses and how actors 
use them to block or facilitate their own or other’s interests.  
Among the most notable research utilizing this aspect of political ecology is that on 
sustainable development and the inherent contradictions present in trying to 
reconcile economic growth with environmental protection (Bryant and Bailey 
1997). It is this sustainable development discourse, as well as less dominant 
discourses such as environmental justice, that are the focus of this article. Escobar 
(1996:46) defines discourse as “the articulation of knowledge and power…the 
process through which social reality comes into being”. It is clear that since the 
1980s, sustainable development has become the dominant discourse in the global 
arena and has impacted the attitudes and actions of governments, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and businesses significantly.  
The concept of sustainable development emerged out of a recognition of the global 
nature of the environmental crisis. It made the environment a matter of global 
responsibility and put it into a temporal perspective such that the focus was the 
needs of current and future generations. Sachs (1999), in his critique of the 
sustainable development “oxymoron”, emphasizes that within this temporal 
perspective there is no distinguishing between the poor and the wealthy or the 
powerful from the powerless. In this way, the values and perspectives of certain 
actors become outweighed by the dominant view. Sustainable development has 
been used by the wealthy and powerful to justify the continuation of economic 
growth at the same levels that have resulted in the current environmental state of 
affairs. The less dominant discourse of environmental justice however, has emerged 
in recent years as an undercurrent in the environmental movement and is gaining 
strength through Third World social movements (Martinez-Alier 2002).  
MOSOP (THE MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE OGONI 
PEOPLE): A CASE STUDY 
The Ogoni people, with an estimated population of 500,000, inhabit the plains of the 
Niger Delta, in south-eastern Nigeria. The Niger Delta has supported large human 
populations for many decades and the area inhabited by the Ogoni, called 
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Ogoniland, is the most densely populated in Nigeria, and possibly Africa (Cayford 
1996). The Ogoni are highly dependent on their environment for their livelihoods 
and make a living primarily on fishing and subsistence farming (Lee et al. 1997).  
The Ogoni are an ethnic minority made up of six sub-groups speaking different 
dialects of the Ogoni language. The sub-groups tend to identify more strongly 
within themselves than between sub-groups and have no “myth of common origin” 
(Osaghae 1995:328). In fact, some groups have rejected a pan-Ogoni identity in the 
past. Despite this, the Ogoni have a long history of a pursuit of self-determination as 
a people. They were one of the last groups in the Niger Delta to be subdued by the 
British colonists and in 1945 they formed the Ogoni Central Union whose purpose 
was to create an Ogoni division distinct from the rest of the region. In the 1950s they 
struggled for a separate state of minority groups and this was achieved in 1967 with 
the formation of Rivers State which is the current political status of the area. This 
continuing struggle to unite the various sub-groups of Ogoniland has been a goal of 
the Ogoni political elites as they try to create a larger and more united ethnic group 
conferring a stronger political advantage (Ibid.). 
In 1956, Nigeria’s first commercially viable oil was discovered in the Niger Delta 
and the first oil wells were installed in Ogoniland in 1958. Currently, petroleum 
exports account for over 90% of Nigeria’s foreign exchange and 80% of the 
government’s revenue (Cayford 1996: 184). It is estimated that Ogoniland alone has 
produced over $30 billion worth of crude oil (Obi 2002: 15). However, due to 
political polarization and ethnic domination by majority groups, Ogoniland remains 
one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions in Nigeria (Cayford 1996).  
Oil production has had a strong impact on the Ogoni people, their intra-group 
relations, and their relations with others groups and the Nigerian state. The 
environmental degradation that Ogoniland has suffered as a result of oil production 
(discussed in more detail below) has given them more incentive to forge close ties 
as they address these common problems. As the group has become further 
marginalized from state power and has suffered continued social and economic 
underdevelopment despite the wealth produced by their land, they have found 
reason to come together to fight this common injustice (Osaghae 1995).  
THE NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT 
Nigeria was colonized by the British in the mid-19th century. Its arbitrary borders 
encompassed the majority ethnic groups of the Igbo, Yoruba, and the Hausa-Fulani 
peoples as well as many other ethnic minorities. After gaining independence in 
1960, the government has undergone a succession of military and civilian regimes 
as well as a civil war in 1967 (Forrest 1995). Nigeria’s economy consists primarily 
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of agriculture, petroleum, trade and manufacturing making up the bulk of the gross 
national product. Petroleum is its primary export commodity and the wealth 
attributed to this export is very unevenly distributed (Salih 1999).  
During British colonization, the existing power structures were used to govern the 
various regions of the country resulting in the reinforcement of the power of the 
elites who then competed for positions of influence. There was a geographical 
power divide in which Northern Nigeria dominated the political and military 
structures and aimed to continue their control of the natural and economic resources 
of the south (Cayford 1996). After just a few years of civilian rule, the Nigerian 
military came to power in a military coup and ever since has been intimately 
involved in the politics of Nigeria and an important part of the political elite. Ibeanu 
(2000:7) points to “three props” on which the Nigerian “militariat” class balanced: 
the military dictatorship, the increase of ethnic and religious communalism which 
filled the gap left by the political parties, and the petroleum industry. A report issued 
by Human Rights Watch states:  
While minority ethnic groups in Nigeria’s multi-ethnic federation have 
successfully demanded that new states and local government units be 
carved out to fulfil their hopes of receiving some benefit from the oil 
money…the Nigerian federation has in practice, paradoxically, become 
ever more centralized and power and money has been concentrated in the 
hands of fewer and fewer people. Politics has become and exercise in 
organized corruption; a corruption perhaps most spectacularly 
demonstrated around the oil industry (HRW 1999).  
Hence, the discovery of oil has had an important impact at the state level as well as 
the local level.  
The government’s political and economic dependence on oil further complicates the 
state’s paradoxical role as both protector of the environment and developer of the 
economy. These responsibilities often directly contradict each other. In 
post-colonial times, Third World states like Nigeria focused on economic 
development with little consideration for the environment. Due to such things as 
economic necessity, national security or corruption, most states continue with 
policies that favour economic development at the environment’s expense despite 
the worsening state of the environment and natural resource depletion. Moreover, 
the most powerful actors within the state structure have often gained their power 
position from control of resources, as demonstrated above, and are therefore 
unlikely to encourage or support a change from the status quo. The state uses its 
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political power over other actors to determine who will exploit and benefit from 
natural resources and how those resources will be used (Bryant and Bailey 1997).   
SHELL CORPORATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Royal/Dutch Shell Group is one of the largest businesses in the world. The Nigerian 
subsidiary, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), accounts for 14% 
of Shell’s total world production and is its largest producer of oil outside of the 
United States (Lee et al. 1997). Although there are other oil multinationals 
operating in Nigeria, Shell is the largest operator in the Ogoni region. Shell’s largest 
joint venture is with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), a state 
owned oil company. This venture results in about one-half of Nigeria’s crude oil 
production and has led to extensive operations in Ogoniland (Kretzmann 1995). Of 
the additional foreign companies operating in the country such as Chevron, Mobil, 
Elf and Texaco, only 5% of the total Nigerian labour force is employed in the oil 
industry (Lee et al. 1997). As stated above, Shell has been estimated to have 
extracted over $30 billion from Ogoniland alone. However, over the past 25 years, 
they are estimated to have spent only $200,000 on development programs in the 
region representing less than 0.5% of the total value of extracted Ogoni oil. The 
Nigerian government has received some compensation from the oil companies, 
meant for the victims of land and property damage, but often the money is not 
channelled to those communities. According to a Human Rights Watch report: 
The multinational oil companies operating in Nigeria face a difficult 
political and economic environment…Successive governments have 
misspent the oil wealth which oil companies have helped to unlock…[and 
have] failed to fund its share of the joint ventures…and has played the 
different oil companies against each other…Acknowledging the difficult 
context of oil operations in Nigeria does not, however, absolve the oil 
companies from a share of responsibility (HRW 1999).  
Because of oil’s extreme importance in the Nigerian economy over the years, the oil 
companies, in their joint ventures with the government, have many opportunities to 
influence the policies of the Nigerian state (Ibid.). Andrea Goodall of Greenpeace 
says “…Shell itself is the most powerful political actor on the Nigerian stage—both 
historically and currently…If Shell wanted to make a difference, they could” 
(Goodall in Kretzmann 1995). Nonetheless, throughout the extensive 
environmental degradation, extreme underdevelopment, and human rights abuses, 
Shell and other oil multinationals have continued their relations with the Nigerian 
government and their accruing of oil extraction revenues.  
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The damage to the environment as a result of oil production has been extensive. The 
poorly managed above-ground pipeline system has resulted in a large number of oil 
spills over the years (Kretzmann 1995). Besides crop and land damage, oil spills 
also result in pollution of drinking water and rivers and streams which are major 
sources of the Ogoni fishing livelihood. In addition to loss of livelihood, serious 
health problems can result from such pollution. Another cause of environmental 
damage is gas flares. Excess gas is burned in large fires which result in ecological 
damage in the area of the flares and physical damage to local resources. Soot is 
produced by the flares which are often located near villages. The soot is washed into 
water sources and soil when it rains causing additional pollution problems (Lee et 
al. 1997).  
Shell and other multinationals have enjoyed the availability of cheap labour, natural 
resources, as well as the laxity of environmental laws and enforcement measures 
which tend to otherwise impinge on the power and wealth of the government at the 
expense of the well-being of local communities. In addition, because of economic 
hardships in the Third World and other external pressures, these states are 
encouraged to industrialize, and for this reason engage in partnerships with TNCs. 
In some cases, the Nigerian government has allowed Shell to evacuate inhabitants 
of oil-rich communities leading to further marginalization of these communities 
(Ibid.). The partnership of the multinationals with the government clearly favours 
the corporate and government elites, who are the primary recipients of the oil 
wealth, and tends to work against the local communities.  
TNCs are a growing force in the global capitalist system which encourages capital 
accumulation via the cheapest methods of resource extraction and labour use 
possible. Because of the Third World’s dependence on the economic benefits of 
TNCs’ operations, the economic power of TNCs can be equated to political power. 
Despite this, TNCs are not immune to challenge from other actors. Because of their 
high profile nature they are vulnerable to boycotts and other actions that reduce their 
capital accumulation and must maintain an image and reputation consistent with 
their consumers’ values and ideals (Bryant and Bailey 1997).  
In many ways, the mainstream sustainable development discourse has been 
incorporated into the policies and ideologies of TNCs. This so-called “greening” of 
business has resulted in stronger environmental policies and the use of “green” 
technology in production processes. This has been one manifestation of the growing 
corporate current of environmentalism and has been the result of increased 
consumer awareness and demand for more environmentally safe products in the 
North. However, while TNCs may project a consumer-friendly environmental 
image, their practice of business has failed, in some cases, to meet these standards. 
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This has been particularly true in Third World countries, where the enforcement of 
environmental policy is weak and government partnerships with TNCs are 
powerful. Those most affected by such environmentally unsound business practices 
generally lack the economic consumer power that is so influential in the North. As a 
result, they must find other means of protecting their environment and demanding 
practice and policy changes from TNCs. 
THE RISE AND FALL OF MOSOP 
The origins of Ogoni mobilization could be said to date back to the 1940’s when the 
political elite saw that a larger and more united group would help them compete for 
government resources. Over the decades following the discovery of oil in 
Ogoniland, environmental degradation and underdevelopment further acted to bring 
the Ogoni together in facing common threats and goals (Cayford 1996). This led to 
the emergence of strong Ogoni activism as they sought greater autonomy from the 
state, access to their natural resources, and economic and social development in 
their region (Salih 1999).  
There were other ethnic groups in the region affected even more negatively than the 
Ogoni, yet these groups did not organize to make demands of the government and 
oil companies. Osaghae (1995) points to two reasons for the Ogoni’s mobilization: 
the failure over the years of the government and oil companies to respond to their 
petitions, and, more importantly, the presence of a radically oriented leadership in 
the Ogoni ranks. Specifically, internationally known author and activist Ken 
Saro-Wiwa spear-headed the formation of MOSOP and held leading positions in the 
other primary organizations involved in mobilization. Saro-Wiwa was a dedicated 
defender of minority rights and his own Ogoni ethnic community, and as a 
renowned author had access to the international community of environmental and 
human rights organizations.  
The primary strategies of MOSOP were to raise awareness of the common 
injustices suffered by the Ogoni people, to gain the support of clan leaders, to use 
media propaganda, and to give people a stake in the struggle by promising material 
and monetary rewards if the movement succeeded. The Ogoni’s grievances 
included the environmental damage suffered as the result of exploitation of the oil 
resources in the region, suppression of their rights to a share of the oil revenue and 
oppression as a minority ethnic group. The first act of MOSOP in their early phases 
of passive resistance was to voice these grievances in the presentation of the Ogoni 
Bill of Rights (OBR) to the Nigerian government. Their primary demands were 
political autonomy within the confederation of Nigerian states, the protection of the 
Ogoni languages, a fair share of the economic resources gained from Ogoniland, 
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and protection of their environment (OBR 1990). The government, however, did 
not respond positively to their requests (Cayford 1996). 
 Over the next two years in 1991 and 1992, MOSOP continued their non-violent, 
passive strategy by taking their fight to the global stage. Through Saro-Wiwa’s 
connections, MOSOP began networking with human rights and environmental 
NGOs around the world such as Greenpeace and the Rainforest Action Network 
(Obi 2002). In this way, MOSOP was able to harness the growing power of the 
global environmental justice and human rights movements. Their struggle against 
the corporate giant Shell Corporation appealed to environmental and human rights 
activists worldwide, and became a symbol for other such struggles in other Third 
World countries.  
In December of 1992, after two years with no response from the Nigerian 
government, MOSOP stepped up their efforts with a direct demand to the oil 
companies to pay billions of dollars in compensation for environmental damages 
incurred over the years, as well as demands that action be taken to stop further 
environmental degradation and to implement environmental protection programs. 
They followed up with a mass demonstration of over 300,000 people, well over half 
of the entire Ogoni population. They voiced their demands for the right to 
self-determination and a share of the oil revenue as well as compensation for 
environmental damage. Similar demonstrations in the following months resulted in 
arrests and an increase in police harassment (Cayford 1996).  
In November of the same year, General Sani Abacha came to power and installed an 
even more repressive regime and used more violent tactics against the ethnic 
minorities in the oil producing Niger Delta. In addition to harassment of Ogoni 
leaders, the Nigerian state set out to encourage violent conflicts between the Ogoni 
and neighbouring groups as well as within the Ogoni themselves (Ibid.). In addition 
to the intra-group fighting, the newly formed Rivers State Internal Security Task 
Force was wreaking havoc on the local communities with regular village raids, 
beating and raping villagers and committing any number of human rights abuses 
(Ibeanu 2000). 
In addition to inciting violence between different ethnic groups and direct 
repression by the police and armed forces, the government took advantage of 
internal strife within MOSOP. When four Ogoni leaders were killed, they took the 
opportunity to arrest Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni members and accused 
them of being responsible for the deaths. In 1995, after a trial which “blatantly 
violated international standards of due process and produced no credible evidence” 
(HRW 1999), the “Ogoni Nine”, including Saro-Wiwa were sentenced to death and 
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expeditiously hanged on November 10, 1995 (Cayford 1996:194). With the death of 
the Ogoni leaders and increasing repressive actions by the Abacha regime against 
the Ogoni communities, MOSOP was seriously weakened.  
In 1998, General Abacha died and was replaced by General Abdulsalami Abubakar. 
Under the new regime, the unprecedented repression unleashed on the Ogoni people 
was relaxed and Nigeria was set on the road to democratic rule, which was achieved 
a year later in 1999 with the election of President Olusegun Obasanjo (HRW 1999). 
The transition from the military regime to democratic rule was welcomed by the 
Ogoni people who have continually experienced repression and marginalization 
under the successive military governments. The Ogoni considered democracy a 
process that could encourage dialogue, negotiation, freedom of expression and 
equality. However, the democratic government in Nigeria continues to favour the 
ethnic majorities in the Northern regions and they continue to control the economic 
resources of the country. The power struggle between the state-oil alliance and the 
Ogoni communities continues and Shell remains active in the country (Ibid.). 
THE POLITICAL ECOLOGY OF AN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
MOSOP AND ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE 
Some of the successes of MOSOP include the considerable international 
recognition gained by the Ogoni people of their environmental plights and human 
rights abuses. Protests against Shell Corporation around the world, withdrawal of 
ambassadors from Nigeria, sanctions and oil embargos against Nigeria, and the ban 
of arms sales are some of the manifestations of this international attention (Lee et al. 
1997). There has been an increased official recognition of the Ogoni’s need for 
compensation and a development commission has been put in place in the Niger 
Delta. Federal revenue to the oil-producing states has been increased from 5% to 
13%. Also, various government bodies have been established, such as the Federal 
Ministry of the Environment, in an attempt to implement the environmental action 
plans and laws as encouraged by the UN convention and declarations.  
No group has organized with the same cohesiveness and dynamism in the Niger 
Delta since MOSOP, and though MOSOP has weakened considerably in its local 
operations it continues to function as satellite groups around the world. In this way, 
it continues to bring international attention to the struggles of the Ogoni and other 
minority groups as they face ongoing environmental degradation from oil 
production and lack of social and economic development despite the region’s 
resource wealth. Over the years, Shell Corporation has incorporated more 
environmental and development programs into its operations in Nigeria, partly as a 
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response to the sustainable development push by the UN and partly as a response to 
pressure from other international organizations and consumers. In last year’s annual 
report, Shell says they have shifted from a community assistance to a community 
development strategy with a focus on capacity building (SPDC 2003). In this way, 
they hope to ensure sustainability of their programs by empowering local 
communities rather than simply funnelling financial assistance to communities and 
local programs through government officials. It is not clear whether this approach 
and other environmental programs on the part of TNCs are actually effective in 
practice and not just company rhetoric. The fact remains that the Niger Delta region 
is extremely poor and underdeveloped despite their oil production, and local 
communities are on the losing end of the state-oil alliance. This is apparent in the 
continuing protests and unmet demands being made by Niger Delta communities 
today that are in many ways inspired by the struggles of MOSOP. 
The sustainable development discourse that became dominant after the 1980s has 
had a strong influence on the actions of governments and businesses. Despite the 
growth of green business, economic growth is encouraged at its current pace and 
protection of the environment is, in some ways, considered secondary. By 
concentrating on the exploitation of oil for economic benefit, the state and 
corporations can claim legitimacy of their actions through the sustainable 
development discourse. Shell and the state design “top-down” development and 
environmental programs to satisfy the sustainability aspect of their exploitation, but 
these programs have little effect at the grassroots level. The dominant culture of the 
sustainable development discourse has made it difficult for grassroots efforts to put 
forth their own ideas of environmental use and protection as an alternative.  
Nonetheless, MOSOP’s effectiveness in harnessing the power of the global 
environmental justice discourse contributed to their eventual successes. At the time 
of mobilization in 1990, there were several prominent environmental justice 
movements emerging in other parts of the world. Issues of land rights, indigenous 
resource use and livelihood security were becoming more visible to the global 
community (Moser and Norton 2001). Their common message of environmental 
justice was carried further into the mainstream by the involvement of a number of 
well-established international NGOs, such as Greenpeace. While sustainable 
development is still the dominant model for policy-making and program 
development, environmental justice has gained some influence in these arenas as 
well. By appealing to this global discourse, MOSOP was able to put additional 
pressure on the powerful state and corporate actors to attend to the requests of the 
Ogoni communities.  
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The ability of a movement to harness the power of international actors such as other 
governments and international NGOs has an important influence on the success or 
failure of movements such as MOSOP. In some cases, a more repressive 
government may contribute to international attention and action. The appeal of a 
movement’s goals and strategies to the global media and public also influences the 
amount of international support gained. In addition, the presence of a relevant 
global discourse related to the movement’s message is key to the involvement of 
international actors. In the case study examined in this article, the global 
environmental justice discourse played an important role in the origins and 
successes of MOSOP. At the same time, the dominant culture of sustainable 
development pushed by governments and international institutions acted to 
legitimize the activity of powerful actors in this case. However, it is interesting to 
note that in an era of a different cultural context, such as prior to the origins of the 
environmental movement in the 1960’s, the Ogoni uprising would likely not have 
had the considerable impact that it did.  
THE POWER OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
The dynamics of a social movement, particularly in the Third World context, 
depend heavily on the distribution of power among different actors. In the case of 
environmental movements and according to political ecologists, power is related to 
access and control of natural resources.  Conflicts arise in part due to an unequal 
distribution of power among the state, grassroots actors and others.  Traditionally 
strong actors such as the state and TNCs have greater control over and access to 
environmental resources than weak actors such as local communities. Here, 
MOSOP represents the attempt of local communities to gain power and control of 
their environments in relation to the opposing forces of the Nigerian government 
and Shell Corporation. 
Though the grassroots organizing of MOSOP has managed to increase the Ogoni’s 
power in relation to the state and oil corporations, these latter actors represent 
powerful opposition to their demands and continue to exercise authority over oil 
resources. While according to political ecology, the state plays a dual role as 
protector of the environment and developer of the economy (Bryant and Bailey 
1997), the Nigerian government has used its position to enhance economic growth 
at the expense of the environment and the livelihoods of citizens.  
The Nigerian state has depended heavily, both economically and politically, on 
petroleum revenue since its discovery in the Niger Delta in 1956. The successive 
military regimes have monopolized the exploitation of oil by controlling and 
determining access to these resources, as well as the distribution of wealth accrued 
from them, at the exclusion of local communities in the oil producing regions. By 
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prioritizing oil extraction over environmental regulations and community 
development programs, the government has attracted the business of oil 
multinationals and formed powerful alliances with these corporations (Lee et al. 
1997). Through their partnerships with the government, these companies gain 
unprecedented access to land and oil resources and hence, a position of power. With 
the dependence of the Nigerian government on its oil wealth and the oil 
corporations, the economic power of TNCs such as Shell is translated to political 
power. In other words, Shell can use its economic influence on the government to 
gain access to oil resources and the accompanying monetary benefits.  
Due to political marginalization, the Ogoni people have little economic resources 
despite the natural wealth of the land upon which they live (Cayford 1996). The 
government-corporate alliance controls the land and resources upon which the 
Ogoni people depend. Political ecologists note the existence of a distribution of 
costs and benefits associated with environmental change (Bryant and Bailey 1997). 
In the current case, the state and TNCs have accrued most of the wealth gained from 
oil revenues, whereas the local communities have been subjected to the 
environmental costs associated with oil extraction, further marginalizing these 
communities and exacerbating the poverty problem. As weak actors in a struggle for 
survival, the Ogoni people have mobilized in an attempt to regain control of their 
land. As MOSOP, they have used a diverse repertoire of strategies and have 
collectively strengthened their position in the struggle for resource access. 
THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 
Environmental movements in the Third World demonstrate the need for changing 
discourse. Sustainable development, as the dominant stream of environmentalism 
today, is not clearly applicable to Third World environmental problems. The above 
examination of MOSOP from a political ecology perspective offers a window to a 
different view of such issues by emphasizing political and economic aspects of 
marginalization in Third World communities. 
Environmental justice is a reflection of the need for alternative views and an 
expression of a different kind of environmentalism that strengthens and is 
strengthened by Third World social movements such as MOSOP. MOSOP 
demonstrates the intricacies of Third World environmental problems, the 
importance of political and economic issues, and the complex relationships between 
Third World governments, transnational corporations and local communities. 
Sustainable development, in its emphasis on future generations, does not provide 
adequate solutions for today’s marginalized poor. On the other hand, environmental 
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justice offers a critique of sustainable development and begins to emphasize human 
rights and recognize the unequal power distributions in Third World settings.  
The current state of affairs in the Niger Delta demonstrates the significant challenge 
facing local communities in reclaiming their environments from the grip of 
powerful state and corporate alliances. Just one week prior to the writing of this 
conclusion, a major occupation of Shell and Chevron oil operations by Ijaw 
villagers from the Niger Delta region ended (BBC News 2004). Their reason for 
protest is the same as that of the Ogoni people in 1990—the continuing poverty and 
underdevelopment of local communities while billions of dollars worth of oil are 
extracted from their land every year. While such injustices have gained more global 
attention in recent years, the struggle continues until the concepts of the 
environment and development are better adapted to our changing world and the 
needs of the majority of the human race. 
It is clear that the global environmental movement has changed since its early stages 
in the 1960s. In many ways, it has fragmented into a number of streams that have 
been taken up by different members of society with very different goals and ideals. 
This article demonstrates how some members of the global community have been 
left behind by the dominant stream of sustainable development. While 
environmental justice has begun to address some of the important issues for these 
marginalized groups, there remains a weakening divide that threatens the integrity 
of human communities and the natural world. Perhaps the environmental justice 
movement and the voices of Third World communities can lead us toward an 
integration of important environmental, social, political and economic issues and a 
more cohesive and strengthened form of environmentalism. 
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REGION BUILDING AND IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE 
BALTIC SEA REGION 
Imke Schäfer∗ 
Abstract 
This paper examines the concept of “new region building” in the Baltic Sea region 
with emphasis on the construction of a collective “Baltic” identity. Possible 
implications of these processes on Russia as a non-EU member state are discussed. 
Region building around the Baltic Sea is conceptualised within the framework of 
social constructivism, and a connection between region building and identity 
formation is established. Furthermore, an attempt is made to shed light on the way 
in which a “Baltic identity” is promoted in the region. By means of a short discourse 
analysis, certain characteristics of the Baltic Sea region are discovered that are 
promoted as the basis for a regional identity by various regional actors. The impact 
of these characteristics on relations between Russia, the EU and the other Baltic Sea 
states are examined and conclusions are drawn in relation to the region building 
processes in the Baltic Sea area.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Cooperation in the Baltic Sea region (BSR) has prospered since the independence of 
the Baltic States in the beginning of the 1990s. Several programmes and initiatives 
have been established, such as the Northern Dimension initiative (ND), the Council 
of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) or the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation 
(BSSSC). The EU actively supports cooperation in this region. In 1997, at the 
Luxembourg European Council, Finland’s Northern Dimension initiative (ND) was 
recognized as part of the external EU policies, and in the year 2000, the EU initiated 
the INTERREG III B programme Baltic Sea Region, thereby continuing the 
INTERREG II B programme (1997-2001):  
The European Commission has decided to take an active part in the 
development of the Baltic Sea Region by part-financing the INTERREG III 
B transnational co-operation programme in favour of the following 
countries: Denmark, North-East Germany, Sweden and Finland in the 
European Union and Norway, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia 
and Belarus (INTERREG III B). 
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Some political and economic stakeholders would like to see the BSR developing 
into a “world leading region for innovation” (Serger and Hansson 2004: III), which 
is characterised by economic prosperity and good living standards. Others 
emphasise the region’s potential for providing security and stability in this part of 
Europe by referring to the concept of a “security community” based on the example 
of the Nordic countries (Browning 2001:7; Browning and Joenniemi 2004:240). 
In the following, after a brief clarification of the term “Baltic Sea region”, a 
selection of the literature dealing with “the new region building”1 and identity 
formation in the BSR will be presented and discussed with emphasis on claims 
made concerning the existence and nature of a Baltic identity. This literature review 
will certainly not be exhaustive but it will provide an impression of the opposing 
interpretations and ideas that exist concerning these issues. Subsequently, a number 
of empirical texts serve as the basis for a brief analysis of normative linguistic terms 
in the current political discourse. The analysis will be conducted along the lines of 
Jessen and Pohl, who have analysed six speeches of European leaders concerning 
the issue of Kaliningrad. They thereby examined the construction of a self-other 
divide with regard to Russia (Jessen and Pohl 2003:15).  
DEFINING THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
Although many “Baltic Sea institutions” include other than the littoral states, in this 
paper, the expression “Baltic Sea region” refers to an area composed of the states or 
parts of the states that have a Baltic Sea coastline. This definition is inevitably 
somewhat imprecise and arbitrary, because it is often impossible to determine 
whether a state should be regarded as belonging to this region as a whole or only 
partly. It is generally problematic to draw an external border of the Baltic Sea region 
along the borders of a state or a county or province, because those entities basically 
exist for administrative purposes and often separate collectives of humans that share 
the same historical or cultural backgrounds. Moreover, as will be discussed below, 
it is a contradiction to the concept of a region to define sharp and static borders that 
distinguish it from other areas. Consequently, a clear geographical definition of the 
Baltic Sea region does not and cannot exist. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
paper, a rough outline of the geographical space referred to by the term “Baltic Sea 
region” must be given, but it should be understood that the borders between this 
region and the adjacent areas are blurred and in a constant process of social 
construction.  
                                              
1 The “new region building” refers to the notion that regions are socially constructed by “region-builders”, mainly 
academics and influential politicians from the states that are part of the region. 
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The states lining the Baltic Sea coast are Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Russia, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Germany. As this paper deals with the 
formation of a collective identity of the inhabitants of the Baltic Sea region, this 
region is defined in very narrow terms. It is expected that people identify as 
inhabitants of the Baltic Sea region only if the Baltic Sea plays a role in their daily 
lives. As a consequence, Germany and Russia can obviously not be counted as 
belonging to the Baltic Sea region as a whole. In the case of Germany, the 
“Bundesländer,” Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, 
are counted as parts of the region; and within the Russian Federation, the 
North-Western Federal District, specifically the area around the cities St. 
Petersburg, Pskov and the Kaliningrad exclave, is regarded as belonging to the 
Baltic Sea region.2 
The distinction between parts that can be defined as belonging to the BSR and those 
that cannot is more difficult in connection with the other, rather smaller states. To be 
precise, with regard to Denmark, only the counties South Jutland, Funen, 
Copenhagen, West Zealand, Roskilde and Storstrøm as well as the island Bornholm 
can be counted as parts of the Baltic Sea region. Concerning Sweden, the counties 
Skåne, Blekinge, Östergötland, Södermanland, Gotland, Stockhom, Uppsala, 
Gävleborg, Västernorrland, Västerbotten and Norrbotten have a Baltic Sea coast 
line. In Finland, this applies to the province Lapland and the sub-state regions 
Northern-Ostrobothnia, Central Ostrobothnia, Ostrobothnia, Satakunta, Finland 
Proper, Uusimaa, Eastern Uusimaa and Kymenlaakso, and in Poland, the 
voivodships West Pomerania, Pomerania and Warmia-Masuria adjoin the Sea. 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia are also referred to as the “Baltic States” and account 
for the so-called “Baltic Region” (in contrast to the Baltic Sea region). Therefore, 
those states are not further split into coastal and non-coastal regions but also 
considered to be part of the BSR (more or less) as a whole. 
THE CONCEPT OF IDENTITY   
Whereas in IR theory the concept of identity is highly disputed and it is hard to find 
a clear definition (Wæver 2002:20f.), A Dictionary of Geography defines identity as 
the:  
                                              
2 As mentioned above, such a definition according to administrative areas is probably very imprecise and the 
“real” border is possibly somewhere in between. However, the politicians in charge of these administrative entities 
are the ones to decide whether to pursue a policy that engages actively in Baltic Sea cooperation or focuses on 
other aspects. Therefore, to some extent, the populations of such an area are all affected by these policy choices 
and so is the BSR. 
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…characteristics determining the individuality of a being or entity; in the 
constitution of national identities these characteristics may be fostered by 
myths. Human geographers commonly view identity as emerging from 
social action, or the production and reproduction of space (Mayhew in A 
Dictionary of Geography 2004). 
This definition is useful for the examination of collective identity, as it refers to a 
“being or entity” and includes the notion of national identity. Its emphasis on a 
constitution of identity that emerges from social action is in line with the 
propositions of social constructivism. Constructivists hold that reality is socially 
constructed in a process by which ideas, beliefs and perceptions are shared (Jackson 
and Sørensen 2003:254). This happens during interaction, mainly discourse 
practises, e.g. “conversations, narratives, arguments, speeches” (Oxford Dictionary 
of Philosophy 1996) by external as well as internal actors of a group (Wennersten 
1999:276, 278). This distinction between actors inside and outside a certain group 
implies another important prerequisite for the construction of identity: the existence 
of a notion of a “self” and an “other”. William Connolly argues that to create an 
identity there always has to be an “other” to demarcate from (Connolly in Jessen 
and Pohl 2003:11). In other words, the self develops its identity by distancing itself 
from the other. 
The development of a collective identity that stretches across the borders of several 
countries is, according to Wennersten, a rather recent trend that is due to “changing 
dynamics in world affairs [that] ‘are sufficiently powerful to encourage imagining 
supranational, transnational, or subnational communities’” (Rosenau in Wennersten 
1999:276). Wennersten also points out that several collective identities can overlap, 
e.g. a group of people can have different political identities at once (Wennersten 
1999:276). In other words, it can be assumed that people in the Baltic Sea region 
identify with their national states as well as develop a regional identity and maybe 
also identify with the EU at the same time.   
Taking into account the definition cited above, it is possible to speak of a Baltic 
identity if a certain amount of characteristics can be discovered that a majority of 
the people living in this area collectively regard as unique. Consequently, to 
describe the Baltic identity, one has to discover a certain amount of characteristics 
that apply to this region3 and are regarded as important by most of its people.  
                                              
3 Unfortunately, there are no ways of determining how many characteristics are necessary to prove the existence of 
this particular identity and it is also difficult to draw the line between the existence of one or various identities.   
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REGION BUILDING IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
A region can be defined as “an area of a country or the world having definable 
characteristics but not always fixed boundaries” (Concise Oxford English 
Dictionary). This definition of a region is similar to the definition of (collective) 
identity. As regions are discursively constructed, as is everything else in the social 
and political world (Jackson and Sørensen 2003), this is perhaps not surprising. The 
notion of “new region building” goes one step further by claiming that 
region-builders deliberately choose the characteristics they want the region to 
possess and make them known to the public, thereby constructing reality by their 
discourse practices4 (Engelen 2004:7ff.). Ole Wæver points out that region building 
in the BSR has become “self-enforcing”: the BSR is perceived to be of importance 
and, consequently, it becomes important (Wæver in Tassinari and Williams 
2003:35). In other words, the perceptions of inside and outside actors contribute to 
the creation of a regional identity.5 In the following, some characteristics will be 
exposed that define the Baltic Sea region and thereby provide a basis for a regional 
identity.  
The concept of a region can be understood in modern as well as in post-modern 
terms. Concerning regions in Europe, two opposite metaphors have been created: 
the “concentric circles Europe” and the “Olympic rings Europe” (Makarychev 
2004:302). The metaphor of concentric circles refers to a modern understanding of 
regions as part of a hierarchy with Brussels at the top, in which the difference 
between the centre and the periphery is considerable. In the metaphor “Olympic 
rings Europe”, all European regions are included, there does not exist a clear centre 
or a periphery, and all regions are equally important. The metaphor “Olympic rings 
Europe” is part of a post-modern understanding of regions (Makarychev 2004:302). 
In the literature, it is often pointed out that the ND – and thereby also the BSR – is a 
good example for a Europe of Olympic rings and a post-modern interpretation of the 
concept of regions (Makarychev 2004; Browning and Joenniemi 2003). Therefore, 
                                              
4 In this context, Browning points out that there is a danger that policy-makers, who promote region building, are 
unconsciously influenced by a Western perspective. Accordingly, “the underlying narratives of the new region 
building (even the ‘post-modern’ ones) also have the propensity to reproduce the very exclusions many hope it 
possible to overcome” (Browning 2001:48). For identity formation, this suggests that the Baltic Sea identity 
reflects the views of those who shaped the region–which are unconsciously based on a conviction of Western 
superiority. Nevertheless, Browning also points out that if people are aware of the “continuing exclusionary nature 
of the discourses underlying the new region building initiatives” (Browning 2001:51), it becomes possible to 
reconceptualise them. 
5 However, it should be kept in mind that the construction of a region around the Baltic Sea was inspired by a 
post-modern theoretical approach. Neumann points out that this region building was conducted by “a tightly knit 
epistemic community of ‘Nordic’ foreign political intellectuals” (Neumann in Browning 2001: 3). In contrast, a 
“region” can also be seen from a more modernist point of view, as it is the case in Russia. The regions in Russia 
have been introduced for administrative purposes and probably have no unifying characteristics that would 
enhance the development of regional identities (Browning and Joenniemi 2003a: 84). 
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one of the characteristics of the BSR is its conceptualisation as a “post-modern 
region” with a focus on dialogue instead of negotiation, inclusiveness and a 
potential to overcome frontiers rather than to create new ones (Browning and 
Joenniemi 2003b:467), and a multitude of networks. These characteristics evolved 
from the policy of the ND. The construction of the EU’s Northern Dimension 
thereby contributed to the current understanding of the BSR. 
Apart from that, some other factors are claimed to be of importance in the BSR. Of 
those, the factor “security” is assumed to have been one of the most important 
driving forces for region building. In the literature, there are diverging positions 
concerning the impact that this factor has had on the BSR. For instance, Browning 
and Joenniemi claim that regional cooperation in the BSR can only function if 
motivated by security (Browning and Joenniemi 2004:245). Adopting a slightly 
different point of view, Morozov argues that desecuritisation in particular is a 
prerequisite for post-modern region building. Desecuritisation is defined here as 
“the process whereby interaction becomes centred on issues other than security, 
while security as such is actually enhanced by avoiding the language of security” 
(Morozov 2004:318).  
Moreover, Tassinari and Williams differentiate between the concepts “hard” and 
“soft security”6 and their implications on region building. They state that “hard”, 
military, security issues are dealt with “from above” by actors such as the EU or 
NATO, whereas soft security matters are addressed by regional actors “from below” 
(Tassinari and Williams 2003:38). For the origin of the BSR, this means that hard 
security concerns have been a motivation for engaging in cross-border cooperation 
for the former Soviet States in order to escape the Russian sphere of influence 
(Browning and Joenniemi 2004:237). However, at the same time, region building in 
the BSR is estimated to have been started “from below with numerous actors in the 
beginning striving for completely different goals” (Tassinari and Williams 
2003:35). Tassinari and Williams thus claim that there are two dimensions of region 
building, one from below and one from above that are complementary and can 
operate simultaneously.  
Those three different approaches towards the origins of a post-modern BSR have 
different implications for its future. Browning and Joenniemi (2004) claim that 
cooperation after EU and NATO enlargement will come to an end unless other 
motivations for cooperation than just security are found. Morozov’s approach to 
desecuritisation, in contrast, suggests that cooperation is becoming motivated by 
other issues than security and will thus continue.  
                                              
6 According to Pynnöniemi and Raik, “soft security” refers to non-military issues and common threats that call for 
cooperative responses (Pynnöniemi and Raik 2003). 
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Tassinari and Williams’ focus on a complementary process of region building from 
above and below implies that soft security issues will lead to continued cooperation 
even after the hard security issues, addressed previously from above, lose their 
immediacy. This explanation of the construction of the BSR as an interplay of 
forces from above and below is also compatible with the claim that the BSR was 
constituted on the basis of the vision represented by the ND. Although the 
policy-makers who created the ND were not concerned with hard security, they 
engaged in the existing processes of cooperation that had developed from below, 
and imprinted an overall concept and a vision from above. 
With respect to the definition provided above, the purpose of this overview was to 
describe the BSR as an area of the world with some special characteristics. Those 
include that it is a post-modern region, symbolising the metaphor of “Olympic rings 
Europe,” that it has no centre, is inclusive and consists of overlapping networks. 
Concerning the origin of the BSR, many academics regard security threats that had 
to be overcome collectively as the starting point for regional cooperation. Further 
characteristics of the BSR can be found, such as geography, since the Baltic Sea 
region is of course to a great extent defined by the Baltic Sea or its location in 
Northern Europe. A thorough exploration of all characteristics of the BSR is, 
however, beyond the scope of this paper. 
To sum it up, the presentation of the concepts “identity” and “region” has 
demonstrated that in the BSR, the processes of identity formation and region 
building appear to be closely interwoven and to happen in parallel. Policy-makers, 
who try to construct a region, inevitably also construct specific characteristics that 
define this region. If the majority of the inhabitants of this region then agree that 
these characteristics define the Baltic Sea region and, if they consider themselves 
part of this region, they develop a regional identity – which in turn has influence on 
their social reality, and thereby the existence and nature of the region. In Catellani’s 
words: “There seems in fact to be a close link between the political objective to 
establish cooperative ties across the Baltic and the need of creating a sense or a form 
of common belonging to a single community” (Catellani 2003:18). 
DIVERGING APPROACHES TOWARDS A BALTIC IDENTITY IN THE 
LITERATURE 
Some academics claim that for several reasons a common BSR identity has failed to 
emerge. Firstly, they state that cooperation has only been established to address 
security risks and to help the Baltic countries and Poland to become democratic 
market economies and therefore, the cooperation will cease to exist after these 
problems are solved (Browning and Joenniemi 2004:243, 245). Secondly, it is 
claimed that tensions between the EU and Russia prevent a common identity from 
IJIS Volume 3
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2005) 
 
 
52 
being established (Browning 2001:52). Thirdly, it has been stated that any identity 
that is imposed on the region cannot function – only an identity that has developed 
slowly over the centuries from below such as the Scandinavian “asecurity 
community” (Browning and Joenniemi 2004) can be sustainable. 
Other academics have noted that the countries around the Baltic Sea prefer to 
highlight – and thereby to identify with – diverging characteristics of the region. It is 
claimed that academics and politicians particularly from Germany, the 
Scandinavian countries and the EU tend to emphasise a common Baltic history and 
actively support the notion of a Baltic identity (Catellani 2003:18; Browning 
2001:5f., 51; Tassinari 2003:10; Jessen and Pohl 2003:11, 13f.). In contrast, in the 
Baltic States and Poland, people are more likely to stress the “Europeanness” of the 
Baltic Sea region that is used in this context as a synonym for being closer to the EU 
and the West (Browning and Joenniemi 2003b:471). Concerning opinions from 
Russian politicians and academics, there can hardy be found any emphasis on 
common traits applying to all littoral states in the literature. The perception of 
Russia as a modern, Westphalian state, which prevails in the current political elite, 
makes it difficult for policy-makers to appreciate the merits of cross-border 
cooperation, networking and political activity on regional levels.  
As to the common images from a shared history that are especially promoted by 
people from Germany, the Scandinavian countries and the EU, it is argued that the 
most well known images are the “new Hanse,”7 Pomor,8 the Viking Age and the 
North. Of those, according to Catellani (2003), the images of the “Hanse” or Pomor 
are stronger than a “Northern” identity – represented by the ND – or an “EU 
identity”. For the Hanse, this claim seems to be confirmed by the fact that this 
trading network is still well known to many inhabitants of the coastal areas along 
the Baltic Sea, because the Hanse once consisted of or ruled over towns like 
Lübeck, Hamburg, Rostock and Stralsund in Germany; Szczecin, Gdansk and 
Elblag in Poland; Kaliningrad (then the German Königsberg), Novgorod and Pskov, 
which today belong to Russia; Tallinn in Estonia; Riga in Latvia; Stockholm, 
Kalmar and Visby in Sweden; and Turku in Finland.  
                                              
7 The words “Hanse” or “Hansa” refer to the Hanseatic League which was “an alliance of trading cities that for a 
time in the later Middle Ages and the Early Modern period maintained a trade monopoly over most of Northern 
Europe and the Baltic” (Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia “Hanse” <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanse> 
[accessed 23.02. 2005]). 
8 “Pomors” (поморы) are settlers of the White Sea coasts. Explorers from Novgorod entered the White Sea 
through Northern Dvina estuary and founded the Russian settlements along its coast. They reached as far as 
trans-Ural areas of Northern Siberia and founded the city of Mangazeya. They maintained a Northern trade route 
between Arkhangelsk and Siberia” (Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia “Pomors” 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pomor> [accessed 22.02. 2005].) 
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However, in spite of this high profile in the region, the image of the “new Hanse” 
has been discovered to evoke rather negative connotations among a number of 
inhabitants of the region, as it is associated with German imperialism. Thus, the 
Hanse does not present the good example of peaceful cross-border cooperation that 
it was intended to be, among others by Björn Engholm in the beginning of the 1990s 
(Engelen 2004:14).Nevertheless, as Jörg Hackman puts it:  
…one might argue that the Hanseatic League is the most appropriate 
conception to use in constructing such as Baltic identity. […] It could be 
argued that the temporary success of the New Hansa as concept was due 
to its vagueness and presumably also to the fact that it does not really 
interfere with contested historical topics amongst the societies on the 
Baltic rim. In other words, the Hansa can easily be associated with 
positive developments such as trade, exchange, wealth and inter-cultural 
contacts. If there was occasionally a slight reluctance towards Engholm’s 
image of the Hansa, this was based not so much on different political 
conceptions as on a national perspective which held that it was blurring 
the colonial role of the Hansa in the past (Hackman 2003:79). 
In other words, the image of the new Hansa does seem to have its advantages, as 
Catalani stated, but it also evokes negative connotations and must therefore be 
treated carefully.  
The metaphors of the Hanse and Pomor fit to the post-modern nature of the region: 
they refer to former loose, open and inclusive trade networks. Those characteristics 
are reflected in institutions such as the CBSS or the UBC. In addition, there are 
institutions in the region that deliberately try to discover and maintain the common 
culture and past and thereby actively contribute to the development of a common 
identity. Such an institution is the Baltic Sea Heritage Co-operation.9 The existence 
of the Baltic Sea Heritage Co-operation shows that some policy-makers have 
already taken active measures in promoting a common identity based on a common 
history and a common cultural heritage; thus, the attempt to create an identity 
definitely exists within the region. 
To sum it up, this review has illustrated the debate about the existence, duration and 
nature of a BSR identity. While there are many arguments supporting each 
approach, what can be stated here is that at least the endeavour to construct a 
common Baltic identity definitely does exist. Institutions such as the Baltic Sea 
Heritage Co-operation promote an identity in the region that is based on a common 
                                              
9 The institution held a Cultural Heritage Forum on “Baltic Sea Identity” in Gdansk in April 2003 (Baltic Sea 
Heritage Co-operation, Homepage <http://balticheritage.raa.se/> [accessed 23.02.2005]).   
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history and a common culture. In the next part of this paper, the previous statements 
regarding a Baltic identity will be complemented by an empirical study. This is 
expected to show to what extent a common Baltic history is of importance for the 
construction of a Baltic identity, which aspects from history are promoted if any, 
and whether there are other characteristics that serve to define “Balticness”.  
LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF CERTAIN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLES 
In this part, five empirical texts will be examined with a focus on possible 
characteristics of the BSR that are promulgated in spoken language. The examples 
comprise, firstly, a speech by the former Commissioner for External Affairs of the 
EU at the eleventh ministerial meeting of the CBSS in Svetlogorsk on the sixth of 
October 2002; secondly, a speech by the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg and 
Chairman of the Committee for External Relations held at the 11th Anniversary 
Conference on Subregional Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region on the 24th of 
October 2003; thirdly, a speech by the President of Lithuania, held at the seventh 
October 2004 at a business lunch hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce in 
Vilnius; fourthly, a speech by the Swedish Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC), held on the 23rd of November 
2004 in Brussels and finally, an interview of the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to the German Newspaper Handelsblatt in Moscow from the 28th of December 
2004. 10  These five examples represent five different institutions: the EU 
Commission, the local government of St. Petersburg, Lithuania’s government, the 
BSPC and Russia’s government.11  
The empirical examples were chosen according to the following criteria: they 
should reflect spoken language, they should be rather new, they should all concern 
the BSR, and they should express the views of inhabitants from different BSR 
countries or members of BSR institutions. Russia is assigned a special role because 
the purpose of this paper is to examine whether an emerging Baltic identity can 
serve to bridge the gap between the Russian BSR inhabitants, as the only non-EU 
citizens, and the people from the other states of the region.  
                                              
10 As Jessen and Pohl put it, speeches today are written not by the speakers themselves but by speechwriters 
(Jessen and Pohl in Hansson 2003: 15). Consequently, they do not reflect the speakers’ opinion but the views of 
the institution that the speaker represents. The same is probably also true for the interviews with politicians. For 
instance, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs mentions himself that it is the President of the Russian 
Federation who decides on the country’s foreign policy (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 
2005: 9).   
11 It would be interesting to examine not only the position of the Lithuania and Russian governments but also the 
other seven countries of the region. Likewise, it would be of interest to examine more institutions than the BSPC, 
the BSSSC and the Commission as well as the positions of other BSR inhabitants. However, a much larger amount 
of empirical research would be necessary to draw a more coherent picture of the current situation in the BSR.  
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It should further be noted that it is not a requirement that the examples of spoken 
language should be made exclusively by people from the region, because the 
perception of outsiders is also of importance for the construction of a collective 
identity. In fact, as a detailed description of each speaker’s background is not a part 
of this paper, it cannot be known for sure whether any of them regards themselves as 
inhabitants of the Baltic Sea region as defined above. It is only possible to 
distinguish whether the institutions represented by the speakers belong to the 
region. Therefore, the speech by the Governor of St. Petersburg is analysed as the 
view of a Russian politician from within the region while the interview with the 
Russian foreign minister can be seen as the perception of an “outsider” who, due to 
his political position, conveys the perception of the Russian government. The 
speech by the Commissioner for External Affairs of the EU is regarded here as an 
outsider’s viewpoint because the Commission is not a Baltic Sea regional institution 
even though it participates actively in Baltic Sea cooperation. The speech by the 
President of Lithuania can be regarded as an insider’s view if one defines the whole 
of Lithuania as belonging to the BSR – this problem could in principle only be 
solved by asking the Lithuanians whether they feel like inhabitants of the BSR. 
Finally, the speech by the Swedish Chairman of the Standing Committee of the 
Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) is considered an insider’s view as the 
BSPC is definitely a Baltic Sea regional institution. As to the positions conveyed in 
the speeches, none of the speeches are understood to reflect the perception of 
Russia, Lithuania, Sweden or the EU as a whole, but as the speeches were held by 
leading politicians, they probably reflect the official positions of the governments or 
institutions they represent. 
It is furthermore considered important that those examples present spoken 
language, because such a form of discourse has to take the setting into account, e.g. 
the words of the speaker have a direct impact on an audience. Additionally, spoken 
language tends to be less factual but more focussed on the mediation of a message or 
vision. Thus, the analysis of speeches or interviews can be expected to shed light on 
the question of how identity is constructed in the BSR. 
The speeches have been evaluated with regard to the use of personal and possessive 
pronouns because through them a divide between the self and the other is 
constructed. Additionally, focus has been on the way in which the terms Europe, 
EU, West, Russia and the BSR are used. Furthermore, attention has been paid to the 
construction of a possible vision for the region, and conclusions concerning an 
identity of the BSR have been drawn.  
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ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY COMMISSIONER CHRIS PATTEN (TEXT 1) 
In his speech at the Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Commissioner Chris Patten 
uses mostly the pronouns “we” and “our” when referring to the Commission, e.g. 
“We need to explore common ground between Russia’s wish to ensure easy transit 
between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia, and our own need to ensure our 
security” (Patten 2002:2). By “ensure our security” the EU-members are included 
into the self, whereas Russia and especially Kaliningrad are linguistically excluded. 
The “other” as opposite of the “self” is constructed in the phrases “our policy on 
Kaliningrad” (Ibid.:1), “Kaliningrad has lagged behind the rest of the Baltic and 
many other regions of Russia” (Ibid.) and “discussion with Russia and the candidate 
countries bordering on Kaliningrad” (Ibid.:1f.). Concerning the use of “Europe,” it 
is interesting that the Commissioner mentions “Europe’s Northern Dimension” 
(Ibid.:1) suggesting that the ND, which is normally referred to as the “EU’s 
Northern Dimension,” goes beyond the EU. Consequently, in this case he 
distinguishes between the notion of “Europe” and the “EU” and includes Russia 
into Europe.  
With regard to the use of the term “EU,” which represents the “self” in this speech, 
the following sentence expresses the role that is attributed to the EU for cooperation 
in the BSR: “The importance of the Northern Dimension can only grow as the 
context of the region changes, and as four more Baltic countries become members 
of the EU” (Ibid.). The ND is also referred to as “a broad concept that touches many 
aspects of EU policy in this region” (Ibid.). 
Russia is mentioned in Patten’s speech in connection with “the spread of organised 
crime, illegal immigration, environmental pollution and diseases like AIDS [which] 
challenge the security of Kaliningrad and Russia as well as that of present and future 
EU Member States”. This image reveals that, from the Commission’s viewpoint, 
Russia is associated with soft security threats. Similarly, tensions between the EU 
and Russia underlie the phrases “discussion with Russia” instead of dialogue 
(Ibid.:2) and “Let us move on from sterile argument about things like the format of 
meetings and start real co-operation on substance” (Ibid., italics added) indicating 
that cooperation between the EU and Russia does not yet function as anticipated. 
However, at the same time, the relations are depicted in positive terms as well, 
evident in the phrases “our Russian friends” (Ibid.) or “our friends in Moscow” 
(Ibid.). 
The BSR is generally mentioned positively in the speech as illustrated with the 
following: “For me there are three key-words for Baltic regional cooperation in the 
coming decade: focus, leadership, and opportunity” (Ibid.). Chris Patten formulates 
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a vision not for the BSR but for the ND: “Europe's Northern Dimension stands on 
the threshold of tremendous new opportunities for continuing democratic 
development, for enhanced regional cooperation, and for shared prosperity” (Ibid.).  
Summarising, the speech shows that although the Commission is an official 
member of the CBSS, the BSR is viewed from outside. This speech does not serve 
the establishment of a Baltic identity but the reinforcement of the EU identity. 
When speaking of the region, the Commissioner underlines the importance of the 
Northern Dimension, which is an EU policy. Russia is treated as an outsider due to 
underlying tensions between the EU and Russia concerning Kaliningrad. The 
message of this speech is that cooperation in an EU frame should be the uniting 
element in the BSR. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE VICE GOVERNOR OF ST. PETERSBURG 
(TEXT 2) 
The “self” that is constructed in the speech by the Vice Governor A.V. Prokhorenko 
of St. Petersburg at a BSSSC Meeting, is the city or the local government of St. 
Petersburg. Occasionally, the Baltic countries are included into the self, which is 
evident in the phrases, “our common history” (Prokhorenko 2003:3), “our common 
past and present, our cultures and our children” (Ibid.:4), and “our organization” 
(Ibid.:5) referring to the BSSSC. 
The “other” is only constructed indirectly: the sentence “we would love to see 
considerable progress in removing visa barriers” (Ibid.) can also be understood as 
criticism towards the EU, which has not yet removed those barriers. So indirectly, 
the EU presents the “other”. 
St. Petersburg is, in this speech, regarded as part of “Europe.” The Southwestern 
Waste Water Treatment Complex in St. Petersburg is described as “the largest 
facility of its kind in Europe” (Ibid.:4). The EU’s role in the BSR is indirectly 
mentioned, as the Northern Dimension programme is said to be progressing. 
Symbols of St. Petersburg’s ties to the West are clearly the presents that are given to 
the city by the other BSR countries. Many of them refer to a common Western 
culture including literature, architecture, music, film, art and history (Ibid.:3f.). 
Those symbols are not discursively constructed in the speech, but described as facts. 
They also reveal that the Baltic Sea countries regard St. Petersburg as one of them, 
not as part of an “other”.  
The BSR plays an important role in this speech, which is shown in the sentence, 
“[s]ustainable peaceful development in our region is conditional on our joint effort 
on addressing our common challenges, building on our common success and shared 
IJIS Volume 3
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2005) 
 
 
58 
advantages both geographic and geopolitical” (Ibid.:5). The BSR is represented as 
inclusive, e.g. “all Baltic Sea nations without exception” (Ibid.:3), and a notion of 
commonness is constructed by referring to history: “our millennium-old common 
history” (Ibid.). The vision of the speech is a continued, sustainable, peaceful 
development based on a common past and present that will lead to a shared future 
(Ibid.:4). 
This speech strongly reflects the effort to construct a common Baltic identity on the 
basis of a common history. The basis for the commonness of all the Baltic countries 
that is taken from history is not, as suggested in the literature, the Hanse or Pomor 
but the Viking Age. The Vice Governor refers to the time of Rurik (Ibid.:3), a 
“semi-legendary leader of the Varangians (Vikings)” 12 that came from Sweden to 
Russia.  
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE PRESIDENT OF LITHUANIA (TEXT 3) 
The “self” in the speech by the President of Lithuania, Mr. Adamkus, speaking to 
the American Chamber of Commerce, includes Lithuania, the Baltic States 
(Adamkus 2004:2) and sometimes the whole BSR (Ibid.:2,3). Russia, not being a 
member of the EU, is regarded as the “other.” It is claimed that Russia should be 
involved “more actively into European affairs” (Ibid.:2). Here “European” does not 
include Russia but means “the EU” or “Western”. At the same time, “the European 
policy” of Baltic governments is regarded as important for the success of the region 
(Ibid.). Consequently, this implies that Russia, as the “other,” needs to adapt to 
“European” values to be included into the Baltic “self” and make the BSR a success: 
“with Russia participating, we can make the Baltic sea region one of the most 
prosperous areas in Europe” (Ibid.). 
The BSR is mentioned positively in the speech: “The current situation in the region, 
which includes affluent Nordic countries, small and dynamic Baltic States, Poland, 
parts of Germany and Northwestern Russia, is well balanced” (Ibid.:1). Most of the 
time, the economic developments are highlighted: “The symbiosis of affluent and 
technologically advanced Nordic states and Germany on the one hand and the 
dynamism of the Baltic States on the other make the Baltic region one of the fastest 
growing regions in the European Union” (Ibid.).  
The vision presented in this speech also refers to economic success, illustrated in the 
sentences, “Therefore, our actions in the long run should aim at reinforcing the 
positive trend that brings welfare to the region via taxes, knowledge and expertise” 
                                              
12 World Encyclopedia. Philip's (2004) “rurik”, < http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview 
=Main&entry=t142.e10078> [accessed 20.02. 2005]. 
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(Ibid); and “Innovation and competitiveness are the two main priorities for the 
Baltic region. These two pillars are crucial in making our region an outstanding 
place to do business” (Ibid.:3). 
Summarising, in this speech the BSR is associated with welfare and economic 
progress. This is probably partly due to the fact that the speech was held at a 
business lunch that was hosted by the American Chamber of Commerce. 
Consequently, in order to impress the American partners, the economic success of 
the region had to be emphasised. As the audience does not comprise members of the 
BSR, the speech has not so much the purpose to construct a feeling of commonness 
but to present the BSR in the most positive way. Evidence of a BSR identity can 
nevertheless be discovered in the frequent reference to this success and to an 
Europeanness that should also include Russia. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BSPC STANDING 
COMMITTEE (TEXT 4)  
In the speech by Mr Olsson, the Swedish Chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the BSPC, the “self” includes the BSPC as well as the people of the region, which 
becomes clear in the sentences, “we can look at the development of the Baltic Sea 
Region as a success story. The region is rich, we have high standards of living, 
people have good education and there is functioning infrastructure in the region” 
(Olsson:1f.). 
The “other” is not strongly presented in this speech, but in the sentence, “we see the 
importance of developing as close relations as possible between the EU and Russia 
as paramount” (Ibid.:3), the EU and Russia are constructed as the “other” in contrast 
to the BSPC. This sentence also shows that the EU is presented as important for the 
region. It is even indicated that the BSPC hoped that the BSR would increase in 
importance after the enlargement which, however, has not yet happened (Ibid.).  
Similarly to the Lithuanian President, the Swedish Chairman also constructs an 
image of the BSR as a prosperous, economically successful region (Ibid.:1). It refers 
briefly to a uniting history, e.g. “rich common cultural heritage and history” 
(Ibid.:2). Additionally, the importance of the BSR in national parliaments is 
underlined: “One of the most significant outcomes of the cooperation, as I see it, is 
the Baltic Sea perspective and Baltic Sea cooperation has become a natural part of 
the everyday work in our national parliaments” (Ibid.:4). The vision evident in this 
speech is that the BSPC should promote the “democratic, economic, social and 
cultural development in the region” (Ibid.). 
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To sum it up, evidence of the promotion of a common Baltic Sea identity can be 
found in the reference to a common culture and history in this speech. Being a BSR 
institution, the BSPR apparently takes part in the construction of such an identity 
because a more coherent and integrated region will improve its functioning and 
importance. For similar reasons, people of the Baltic Sea that are united by a 
common history are advised to regard themselves as inhabitants of a prosperous, 
successful region that is on the way to gaining more importance within the 
framework of the EU. It is expected that the Russian parts of the region can easily 
adapt to these aims. 
ANALYSIS OF THE SPEECH BY THE RUSSIAN MINISTER OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS (TEXT 5) 
In the interview with the German newspaper “Handelsblatt,” the Russian Minister 
of Foreign Affairs refers to the Russian government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Russian Federation:1) or the Russian Federation (Ibid.:2) when he uses the 
pronoun “we.” The “self” is also constructed in the way that Russia is described as 
“one of the leading military and economic powers” (Ibid.:4) and when it is claimed 
that the Russians live in a “real world of real politics” (Ibid). The “other” in the 
interview are clearly the Baltic states Latvia and Estonia, who do not observe 
minority rights and allow Russian minorities to be discriminated against, (Ibid.:3). 
In addition, Europe is part of the “other,” evident in the phrase “we asked the 
Europeans” (Ibid.:4), as is the EU, which in the context of minority rights’ issues 
“ignored these problems” (Ibid.:3).  
The notion of Europe that is constructed by Mr. Lavrov’s words is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, Europe is regarded as not including Russia. For example, the Foreign 
Minister speaks of exports “to Europe from Russia” (Ibid.:4). On the other hand, he 
explicitly states, “And then Russia too, in all the parameters, is of course a European 
country” (Ibid.:5). This reflects clearly that the discussion of Russia’s European 
identity still is not solved internally. The EU is often associated with Europe and the 
West (Ibid.:2). It is represented by the EU Commission, which violates obligations 
to Russia (Ibid.:4). Nevertheless, the necessity of a functioning partnership is 
highlighted: “Geography, economy, history, culture – all this conditions the 
necessity of our partnership with the European Union” (Ibid.:5). The Foreign 
Minister states that EU membership of Russia is not even considered theoretically 
(Ibid.:6) due to the complicated accession of the 10 new members (Ibid.).  
The notion of the West is represented by Europe and NATO (Ibid.:2). Lavrov 
admits, “we are partners with NATO, but we see no point in the NATO 
enlargement” (Ibid.:7) and also mentions concerns on the Russian side: “For 
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practically on the day of the declaration of the enlargement AWACS aircraft 
immediately began to fly along the Russian borders, and combat aircraft were 
deployed in Lithuania” (Ibid.). Consequently, Russia’s relations to the West appear 
rather complicated and fragile but are nonetheless viewed as important by both 
partners. 
The BSR is not mentioned at all when the Foreign Minister enumerates the 
countries, regions and states that are of interest for Russian foreign policy 
(Ibid.:4f.). However, the region is referred to in connection with hard security: “this 
region from the point of view of security presents no threats at present” (Ibid.:7). 
A vision for the future can be found in the following sentence: “we want to 
safeguard our interests not through confrontation, but through a dialogue 
partner-like, constructive and pragmatic” (Ibid.:4). This reveals that although the 
Foreign Minister stresses the words “dialogue” and “partner,” he nevertheless also 
refers to the Russian self-interest, which is characteristic for a realist worldview. 
Concluding, it can be said that for the Russian government the BSR only plays a 
role in the context of hard security issues. These findings confirm the view 
presented in the literature that the BSR is marginalized in Russian politics and that 
(military) security is still very important in the discourse of the current political 
elite. Nevertheless, this interview also includes the statement that the EU and Russia 
are united by their common history, as they are both “European”. 
ASSESSMENT OF THE LITERATURE AND THE LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 
The results from the empirical analysis confirm some of the statements presented in 
the literature review. For example, in the literature it has been suggested that in the 
Baltic States the aspects “being European” and “independent from Russia” play a 
strong role. The President of Lithuania13  indirectly supports this notion in his 
speech by presenting a “European policy” as the key to success for the governments 
of the BSR. He also emphasises that Russia should become a part of Europe, which 
illustrates that the Lithuanian government would appreciate it if Russia was 
included into Europe and operated under the umbrella of the EU. 
In addition, the interview with the Russian Foreign Minister seems to confirm the 
statement that security is still important for the Russian government’s perception of 
the BSR. Conversely, in the speech by the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg, security 
                                              
13 Representing the position of the government, not all Lithuanians! 
IJIS Volume 3
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2005) 
 
 
62 
has not played a role at all.14 This shows once more that, first of all, there can be 
several approaches towards the nature of the BSR if one examines several examples 
of discourse within one country. Obviously, there does not exist only one discourse 
in Russia, nor does there exist only one identity of the people in the BSR. For 
generalisation purposes, it can be stated that there seems to be differences between 
the position of the local government of St. Petersburg and the Russian government 
towards the BSR. Secondly, these differences can also be seen as representing the 
internal split between “pro-European” and “pro-Eurasian” Russians, which is an 
important aspect of the construction of identity in Russia and thus should be taken 
into account with regard to a collective identity in the BSR. 
Furthermore, the EU Commission’s perception of the BSR presented in the 
literature has also been verified in the study. The speech by Chris Patten suggests 
that although the Commission approves of the region’s success, it attributes this 
success exclusively to the ND, which is an EU policy. The Commissioner’s attitude 
towards Russia expresses indirectly a notion of Western superiority. Consequently, 
in line with the arguments found in the literature, the Commission seems to support 
a “Northern Dimension identity” in the BSR that is close to an “EU identity” and 
that is based on a demarcation from “Russian problems” such as organised crime. 
Finally, as also mentioned in the literature review, the image of the Viking Age is 
used in the BSR as a basis for a common identity. The Vice Governor of St. 
Petersburg underlines this in his speech. To a lesser extent, he also highlights “the 
North” as a basis for an identity, though not associating this with the BSR but with 
an Arctic region. The fact that he does not mention the Hanseatic League as a basis 
for a common identity can easily be explained. Unlike Novgorod, Pskov or Tver, St. 
Petersburg has not had any connections to this trade alliance.15 However, in order to 
determine whether the Viking Age plays an important role as a basis for a Baltic 
identity in general, more research is necessary.  
Some additional findings have been made in the examination. Firstly, economic 
success and prosperity is emphasised in the texts 2, 3 and 4 and can therefore be 
assumed to play an important role for the way in which the policy-makers of the 
BSR view the region. Secondly, Europeanness is mentioned in the texts 1, 2, 3 and 
5. This notion is therefore not only important for the government of Lithuania but 
                                              
14 Of course, this may be due to the circumstances under which the speech was held. In order to find out whether 
security only plays a role in connection with the BSR from Russian outsiders’ points of view, it is necessary to 
analyse a much larger amount of empirical data, which was beyond the scope of this paper. 
15 “Hanseatic league” in Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia (Online database). Available from 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanseatic_League#Members_of_the_Hanseatic_League> [accessed 22.02. 2005]. 
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also for the policy-makers in St. Petersburg and in the Commission. Thirdly, a 
common Baltic history is mentioned in texts 2 and 4.  
As a result, the examples suggest that an emphasis on Europeanness is likely to be 
found in the discourse16 concerning the BSR – it is mentioned by outsiders, such as 
the Commissioner, as well as insiders of the region, such as the Vice Governor of St. 
Petersburg and the President of Lithuania. However, the fact that Europeanness also 
plays a role in the interview with the Russian Foreign Minister is of little importance 
here, as this is not explicitly associated with the BSR and therefore it provides 
insights in the process of constructing a collective Russian identity rather than a 
Baltic identity. Moreover, a common history seems to play a role as a basis for 
identification, which is shown among other things in the gifts to the 300th 
anniversary of St. Petersburg. A factor that seems to unite only the inhabitants of 
EU member states in the BSR seems to be the economic success of the region. Only 
the representative of the Russian government mentions security in connection with 
the BSR and only the Commissioner emphasises the ND as important for the BSR; 
therefore, they are not considered further as bases for a BSR identity. 
Consequently, the literature review and the empirical study of the discourse 
examples of certain politicians have shown that a common history and a common 
culture, expressed in metaphors such as the Viking Age, could be an important 
characteristic of the BSR. A common past and culture is also emphasised by some 
of the institutions of the BSR. In addition, Europeanness is used as a basis for a 
Baltic identity and supported not only by people from the Baltic States and Poland17 
but also by representatives from St. Petersburg in Russia and the EU. Another 
aspect has been noticeable in the empirical study is the region’s economic success. 
A vision of prosperity and high living standards throughout the region – similar to 
the vision presented in the introduction – therefore seems to provide a third 
important characteristic of the BSR and a basis for a Baltic identity. 
The findings of the preceding chapters lead to the central question of this paper: 
What influence can a BSR identity have on the self-other divide between “Western 
Europe” and “outsiders” such as Russia? In the literature as well as the empirical 
study, tensions between the EU and Russia have been apparent. The self-other 
                                              
16 “The discourse” does not indicate that there is only one discourse in one region, state etc. but refers to the sum of 
spoken and written language in a certain area. In this context, analysing the discourse of the Baltic Sea region 
refers to a thorough examination of some examples of spoken or written language, as it is impossible to examine 
the whole discourse. By referring to the discourse of the Baltic Sea region, the results of the analysis of certain 
examples are meant, and it is clear that a more broad or differently conducted analysis would possibly come to 
other results about the regional discourse – which does not mean that either of the results are wrong but that the 
discourse can include many aspects and also change over time. 
17 Cf. the section on “Diverging Approaches towards a Baltic Identity in the Literature” above. 
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divide between the EU and Russia, Europe and Russia, or the West and Russia has 
been perceptible in all five empirical texts. The different characteristics of the 
region have diverse implications for this divide.  
Firstly, an identity based on a common past and culture seems to include and unite 
all BSR countries. However, one has to be aware that the policy-makers 
constructing the region and its identity are today mostly EU-citizens. Their visions 
of the BSR are chosen on the basis of Western values. This applies to the Hanse, 
which started as an alliance of German traders that began to explore and dominate 
the Baltic Sea region. Therefore, although it has been said that the image of the 
Hanse corresponds to the post-modern nature of the BSR, it might not be as 
inclusive as it seems. Moreover, the Viking Age, which was presented as an 
example of a uniting history by the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg, must be treated 
carefully too. Precisely the legend of Rurik, the founder of the first “Rus” empire, 
has led to disputes among historians. The interpretation of the legend that is mostly 
supported by Western scholars suggests that the ancestors of today’s Russia came 
from Scandinavia. Another way of interpreting the legend, which is put forward 
mostly by historians from Eastern Europe, holds that the ancestors of Russians were 
Slavs. Although the Vice Governor even underlines the Swedish origin of Rurik and 
does not seem to regard Scandinavian ancestors as problematic, it cannot be 
expected that all Russians are of the same opinion. Consequently, by referring to a 
common Baltic history as a basis for identity and taking as an example the Vikings, 
one could implicitly reinforce claims of Western superiority and Eastern or Slav 
inferiority by taking sides with the Western interpretation of the legend of Russia’s 
origin.18  
Secondly, Europeanness has been highlighted as a basis for a BSR identity. For 
Russian BSR inhabitants, like the Vice Governor of St. Petersburg, this notion does 
not seem to pose problems because he makes it clear that he considers St. Petersburg 
a part of Europe – but the Russian government might see things in a different light. 
Europeanness has several connotations. For the politicians from the Baltic States 
and Poland and to some extent Northwest Russia, an identity based on 
Europeanness seems to underline Western values and strengthen their ties to the 
EU. For some Russians, Europeanness is interpreted in geographical terms but not 
so much in cultural terms, but other Russians associate Europeanness with Western 
notions of superiority. From the interview with the Russian Foreign Minister, it was 
                                              
18  Cf. “Rurik: disputed origin” in Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia (Online database), 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rurik#Disputed_origin> [accessed 24.08. 2005]; “Rus’ (People)” in The Free 
Dictionary By Farlex (Online database), <http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/Rus%27+%28people%29> 
[accessed 24.08 2005]. 
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evident that the Russian government sometimes depicts being European as 
something positive and sometimes as negative. 
Thirdly, economic success and welfare appear to be a rather strong basis for a BSR 
identity. Yet, an identity based on this vision can hardly be sustainable if the BSR 
fails to develop into one of Europe’s most prosperous regions and this vision is 
proven wrong. What is more, this basis for an identity mostly applies to the EU 
member states of the BSR and leaves out Russia. The economic prospects for the 
near future are less promising for the Russian regions than for the other BSR 
countries. Consequently, an identity based on this aspect is also likely to widen the 
gap between Russia and “the West”. 
It can be argued that none of these aspects alone can provide the people of the region 
with a basis for developing a Baltic identity. But many people living in the BSR 
could possibly agree to have several aspects in common. A certain amount of 
historical connections, the notion of belonging to Europe, and the awareness of 
being an inhabitant of a region with a large economic potential – in addition to 
living close to the Baltic Sea with its unique characteristics – may be characteristics 
that in the long-term perspective could become aspects of a common Baltic identity.  
CONCLUSION 
The aim of this paper has been to discuss the connection of “new region building” in 
the Baltic Sea region to the construction of a collective identity with respect to the 
implications on Russia as a non-EU member state  
The starting point of the essay was a presentation of the connection between 
processes of region building and the construction of identity in the BSR. Based on a 
literature review, it was concluded that processes of region building and identity 
formation in the BSR are closely interwoven. The identity of the region and the 
region itself are continually constructed in discourses through a demarcation of the 
self against the other. Therefore, the policy-makers who construct the identity of the 
BSR by means of their discursive practices also construct the region as a whole.  
Secondly, a possibly existing identity of the BSR has been examined closer with 
regard to literature and an empirical study. The identity of the BSR has been defined 
as the sum of characteristics that determine its individuality. In the literature, it is 
claimed that the most outstanding characteristics of the BSR are its post-modern 
qualities, symbolised by the metaphor of Olympic rings Europe, its inclusiveness 
and its overlapping networks. Other characteristics – or bases for identification – 
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have been found in the empirical study: the Viking Age as a common history, 
Europeanness and economic success.  
By means of the empirical study, it has not been possible to determine which of the 
characteristics, if any, have been the most important for constituting a Baltic 
identity. Nevertheless, it has been stated that each of the characteristics emphasised 
in the empirical study could have negative implications on the relations between 
Russia and the other BSR countries if a Baltic identity was promoted carelessly. 
Firstly, the aspect “Viking Age” as a common history for the whole BSR could 
touch upon a highly disputed issue about Slavic and thereby Eastern versus 
Scandinavian and thus Western influences in the history of Russia. Secondly, the 
characteristic “Europeanness” should be handled with care. The policy-makers 
should avoid associating the word “European” with “Western”. Finally, welfare and 
economic success as components of a Baltic identity are most likely to widen the 
gap between Russia and its EU neighbours. It is questionable whether the Russian 
regions can feel part of Europe’s most successful region as long as the new EU 
border prevents them from benefiting from the economic success in the same way as 
their Baltic neighbours do. Only if the Russian regions reached the same level of 
prosperity as the other parts of the BSR, could this divide be closed. As to whether 
cooperation in the BSR will solve the tensions between the EU and Russia or 
whether the BSR will continue to be of political importance at all is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
It is the people of the Baltic Sea region who have to adopt those characteristics in 
order for a Baltic identity to come into being. Whether this is already the case, only 
large-scale empirical research can show. Thus it remains to be examined whether 
inhabitants of, for example, Zealand in Denmark, Pomerania in Poland and the St. 
Petersburg district of Northwest Russia feel a notion of commonness because they 
share the same history, because they all are Europeans and because they all believe 
in the economic success of “their” region, or because of completely different 
characteristics they attribute to the BSR – if a notion of that region exists in their 
minds at all. 
IJIS Volume 3
IMKE SCHÄFER – REGION BUILDING &IDENTITY FORMATION IN BALTIC SEA REGION 
 
67  
REFERENCES 
Adamkus, Valdas (2004) “Speech by H. E. Mr. Valdas Adamkus ‘Maintaining Dynamism in the 
Baltic Region – Visions for the Future’, Business lunch hosted by the American Chamber of 
Commerce, Vilnius, 7 October 2004”. Available from: 
<http://www.president.lt/en/news.full/5298> [Accessed 29.05.2005]. 
Andreasen, Henry (2003) “Poland, Local Co-operation and Kaliningrad” in Bernd Henningsen 
(ed.) Russian Participation in Baltic Sea Region-Building: A Case Study of Kaliningrad. (The 
Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe, Vol. 5, 92-112). 
Baltic Sea Heritage Co-operation [Homepage] available from: <http://balticheritage.raa.se/> 
[Accessed 23.02.2005]. 
Browning, Christopher S. (2001) The Region-Building Approach Revisited: the Continued 
Othering of Russia in Discourses of Region-Building in the European North. (Copenhagen: 
Copenhagen Peace Research Institute COPRI Working Papers 6, 1-63). 
Browning, Christopher S. and Joenniemi, Pertti (2003a) “The Identity of Kaliningrad: Russian, 
European or a Third Space?” in Bernd Henningsen (ed.) The Baltic Sea Region in the European 
Union: Reflections on Identity, Soft-Security and Marginality. (The Baltic Sea Area Studies: 
Northern Dimension of Europe, 28-58). 
Browning, Christopher S. and Joenniemi, Pertti (2003b) The European Union’s Two 
Dimensions: The Eastern and the Northern. (Copenhagen: Institute for International Studies IIS, 
Vol. 34(4), 463–478). 
Browning, Christopher S. and Joenniemi, Pertti (2004) “Regionality Beyond Security? The 
Baltic Sea Region after Enlargement”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association, Vol. 39(3), 233–253. 
Catellani, Nicola (2003) ”EUropean Identity-Building and the Northern Periphery” in Bernd 
Henningsen (ed.) The Baltic Sea Region in the European Union: Reflections on Identity, 
Soft-Security and Marginality. (The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of Europe, 
10-26).  
Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2004) in Oxford Reference Online [Online database]: 
Oxford University Press. Available from: 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t23.e47212> 
[Accessed 14.02. 2005]. 
Engelen, Hilde D. (2004) The Construction of a Region in the Baltic Sea Area. (Geneva: 
Graduate Institute of International Studies). 
European Commission (2005) INTERREG III B - Baltic Sea Region (D-DK-FIN-S-Third 
countries). Available from: 
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/country/prordn/details.cfm?gv_PAY=DE&g
v_reg=ALL&gv_PGM=2000RG160PC007&LAN=5> [Accessed 10.02.2005]. 
IJIS Volume 3
THE INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (2005) 
 
 
68 
Hackman, Jörg (2003) “Past Politics in North-Eastern Europe: The Role of History in Post-Cold 
War Identity Politics” in Marko Lehti and David J. Smith (eds.) Post-Cold War Identity Politics: 
Northern and Baltic Experiences, 78-100. London: Frank Cass Publishers. 
Jackson, Robert and Sørensen, Georg (2003/1999) Introduction to International Relations: 
Theories and approaches. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Jessen, Renée and Jana, Pohl (2003) ”Caught in Europe” in Cecilia Hansson (ed.) Thoughts on 
Europe: Young Scholars on Contemporary European Issues. (1), 9-22. 
Makarychev, Andrey S. (2004) “Where the North Meets the East: Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ 
and Poland’s ‘Marginality Strategy’”, Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic 
International Studies Association Vol. 39(3), 299–315. 
Mayhew, Susan (2004) “identity” in A Dictionary of Geography, Oxford Reference Online. 
[Online database] Available from: 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t15.e1606> 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (2005) “Transcript of the Interview 
Granted by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov to the German Newspaper 
Handelblatt (Moscow, December 28, 2004)”. Available from: 
<http://www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/eef893aea46754cac3256f87002b2601?OpenDocument> 
[Accessed  29.05.2005]. 
Morozov, Viatcheslav (2004) “Russia in the Baltic Sea Region Desecuritization or 
Deregionalization?” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies 
Association, Vol. 39(3): 317–331. 
Olsson, Kent (2004) “Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) in Brussels”. Available 
from: <http://www.kk.dk/baltic-conference/end/final_Kent_Olsson_23.11.1.doc> [Accessed   
29.05.2005]. 
Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (1996) [Online database]: Oxford University Press. Available 
from:<http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t98.e705> 
[accessed 22.02. 2005]. 
Patten, Chris (2002) “Speech at the Council of the Baltic Sea States - Eleventh Ministerial 
Meeting, Svetlogorsk, 6 March 2002 - SPEECH/02/98”. Available from: 
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/patten/sp02_98.htm> [Accessed 29.05.05]. 
Prokhorenko, A.V. (2003) “Speech at the 11th Anniversary Conference on Subregional 
Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region, St. Petersburg”. Available from: 
<http://backweb.signalera.se/documents/B9603776-8191-4D90-AFF5-1BBB8D59C814.pdf> 
[Accessed 29.05.2005]. 
Pynnöniemi, Katri and Raik, Kristi (2003) [Book review on] European Soft Security Policies: 
The Northern Dimension by Holger Moroff (ed.). Available from: 
<http://www.upi-fiia.fi/julkaisut/ND_sarja/nd_Moroff_summary.htm> [Accessed 29.05.2005].  
IJIS Volume 3
IMKE SCHÄFER – REGION BUILDING &IDENTITY FORMATION IN BALTIC SEA REGION 
 
69  
Stenlund, Peter and Nissinen, Marja A Northern Dimension for the Policies of the European 
Union. Available from: <http://virtual.finland.fi/finfo/english/northdim2.html> [Accessed 
14.02.2005]. 
Tassinari, Fabrizio and Williams, Lena-Kaarina (2003) ”Soft-Security in the Baltic Sea Region: 
Environmental Co-operation as a Pilot Project for Regional Integration in the Baltic Sea Area”, 
in Bernd Henningsen (ed.) “The Baltic Sea Region in the European Union: Reflections on 
Identity, Soft-Security and Marginality”, The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern Dimension of 
Europe, Vol. 5: 27-57. 
Tassinari, Fabrizio (2003) “Russian Self-identity and the Baltic Sea Region: Trajectories of 
Regional Integration” in Bernd Henningsen (ed.) “Russian Participation in Baltic Sea 
Region-Building: A Case Study of Kaliningrad”, The Baltic Sea Area Studies: Northern 
Dimension of Europe, Vol. 5: 10-35. 
The Free Dictionary By Farlex “Rus’” [Online database] Available from: 
<http://encyclopedia.thefreedictionary.com/> [Accessed 24.08.2005]. 
Wennersten, Peter (1999) “The Politics of Inclusion: the case of the Baltic States”, Cooperation 
and Conflict, Vol. 34 (3): 272-296. 
Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia [Online database] Available from: <http://en.wikipedia.org> 
[Accessed 29.05.2005] 
Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia “hanse”. [Online database] Available from: 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanse> [Accessed 23.02. 2005]. 
Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia “hanseatic league”.  [Online database] Available from: 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hanseatic_League#Members_of_the_Hanseatic_League> 
[Accessed 22.02. 2005]. 
Wikipedia the Free Encyclopedia “pomors”. [Online database] Available from: 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pomor> [Accessed 22.02. 2005].  
World Encyclopedia Philip's (2004) “rurik” in Oxford Reference Online. [Online database] 
Available from: 
< http://www.oxfordreference.com/views/ENTRY.html?subview=Main&entry=t142.e10078> 
[Accessed 20.02. 2005] 
Wæver, Ole (2002) “Identities, communities and foreign policy: discourse analysis as foreign 
policy theory” in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.) European Integration and National 
Identity: The challenge of the Nordic states, 1-49. London: Routledge.
IJIS Volume 3
IJIS Volume 3
THE DOMESTIC USE OF EUROPEAN POLICIES 
–EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICIES IN EASTERN 
GERMANY AND SOUTHERN ITALY 
Joerg Baudner∗ 
Abstract 
Although network governance and multi-level governance approaches have had to 
revise some of their claims, comparative empirical research and revised 
conceptualisations of the impact of European regional policies are rare. This paper 
conceives of European regional policy as a process of policy diffusion in which the 
supply side of (European) policies and the demand side of the domestic arena can be 
linked in different ways. The paper will present, firstly, an analysis of the 
opportunity structures European regional policies provide for domestic actors; and, 
secondly, a typology of different domestic constellations which lead to a different 
use of European policies. The empirical cases of eastern Germany and southern 
Italy, two of the most important underdeveloped areas in western Europe, 
demonstrate that the use of European policies for the empowerment of the regions 
and for a transformation of policies and polity are two of the possible results of the 
impact of European regional policy, but they are bound to very specific domestic 
preconditions. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
European regional policies have been among the first policy areas in which 
attention shifted from analysing the building of European institutions to analysing 
the impact of these institutions on policies and polity of the member states - long 
before the debate on “Europeanisation” emerged. Network governance and 
multi-level governance approaches have deducted their analysis of the impact of 
European regional policies from their claim of a specific emergent European polity. 
Although, on the one hand, both approaches had to revise their core claims and, on 
the other hand, a broad literature on case studies had emerged, comparative studies 
on the differential impacts of European regional policies can hardly be found.1  
This paper conceives European policies as an opportunity structure for domestic 
actors. European policies can be used for the empowerment of one domestic actor or 
                                              
∗Joerg Baudner is a PhD candidate at the University of Birmingham, and has been a visiting scholar at 
SPIRIT-Europe, Aalborg University in 2005.   
1 For exceptions, see Conzelmann 2002 and Lang 2003. 
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to promote a transformation of policies and polity. However, in this process, the 
supply side, i.e. European policies, and the demand side, i.e. the respective domestic 
arena, are much less directly linked.  Furthermore, the opportunity structures of 
European regional policies are less uni-directional than multi-level governance and 
network governance approaches have claimed. The paper aims to provide a more 
comprehensive framework for the comparison of reactions to European policies by 
the domestic arena. Empirically, it will consider the case studies of eastern 
Germany and southern Italy,2 two of the most important underdeveloped areas in 
Western Europe. Both member states are founding members of the European Union 
and are known for a positive attitude towards European integration. Eastern 
Germany and southern Italy reach only about 60% of the GDP per capita of the 
national average and less than 70% of the European average. Therefore they are 
targets of national regional policies as well as beneficiaries of objective one 
programmes of the structural funds targeted at the least developed regions in 
Western Europe. Both areas receive about 20 billion Euro support by the structural 
funds in the period 2000 to 2006.  
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, it will summarise the criticism brought 
forward against multi-level governance and network governance approaches. 
Secondly, it will analyse the opportunity structures European policies provide for 
domestic actors in vertical and horizontal governance. Thirdly, it will identify the 
character of domestic institutions and the position of the gate-keeper as the 
determining factors for the use of European policies. Fourthly, it will demonstrate 
how different institutional settings and the struggle for the position of the 
gate-keeper shaped the impact of European policies on regional policies in southern 
Italy and eastern Germany.  
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE AND 
NETWORK-GOVERNANCE APPROACHES 
Both multi-level governance and network governance approaches have linked their 
analysis of the impact of European regional policy to their claims of the character of 
the emergent European polity. Multi-level governance approaches have claimed 
that the emergence of a “third level in Europe” (Jeffery 1997) would empower the 
regions in Western Europe in relation to national governments. According to its 
proponents, European regional policies establish direct links between the 
Commission and the regions. These links produce an “upward stream” in policy 
                                              
2 This paper is based on the author’s own research and interviews in Germany and Italy as well as on a synthetic 
overview of secondary literature to which the author has also contributed (Bull and Baudner 2004, Baudner and 
Bull forthcoming). 
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formulation, in particular with the organisation of regions in the Committee of the 
regions, and a “downward stream” in policy implementation given the strong role 
for the regions in the implementation of the structural fund programmes. The 
coherency and validity of these arguments had been called into doubt by three 
arguments. First, the role of the nation state has been underestimated. After initial 
mobilisation at the European level, regions returned to promote their interests 
through their national governments. Furthermore, regions that benefit from 
structural fund programmes mostly lack the institutional capacity to make full use 
of them and the political clout to be empowered by them (Bailey and de Propis 
2002). Second, regional policy is a “mixed blessing” (Thielemann 2002). Structural 
funds came into existence as a compensation for the effects of increased market 
competition brought about by the market liberalisation in the process of European 
integration. This process of “negative integration” included not only abolishing 
barriers to EU-wide trade but also cutting back on state aid for lagging regions. 
Some authors have even claimed that state aid control had been for a long time the 
most important European regional policy (Yuill et al 1997). Third, multi-level 
governance approaches have (somehow paradoxically) dealt with the interaction of 
governments in vertical governance and neglected the attempt of the Commission to 
bring non-state actors in. This latter process takes place at the sub-national level and 
poses requirements also for sub-national authorities. 
The proponents of the network governance approach claim that European policies 
are aimed less at differential empowerment than at a different quality of relations 
between different tiers of state authorities and non-state actors. They have predicted 
a more comprehensive and strongly “ideational” impact of European policies. The 
argument, in brief, is that the Commission is aware of the democratic deficit at the 
European level and the necessity of a sympathetic treatment of target groups. 
Consequently it promotes the inclusion of social and economic actors into a new 
mode of governance to increase legitimacy and efficiency of European policies. In 
particular, structural fund programmes constitute a policy field, which becomes an 
area of “socialisation” into new principles and procedures. 
In the EC context, involvement may be considered to be the most effective 
way of bringing about change in governance. … Being involved in the 
formulation and implementation of European policies and in the 
concertation of transnational interests, [the actors] become socialised to 
new practices. Being involved implies being part of an institutionalised 
learning process. Experience will teach the deficiencies and/or 
attractiveness of a particular mode of governance (Kohler-Koch 
1999:28-29).  
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The concept of network governance refers to a “specific system of interest 
mediation” that is based on the pursuit of partial interests by its actors (which 
distinguishes it from statism and corporatism which are based on the notion of a 
common interest) and the principle of concertation (which distinguishes it from 
pluralism that is based on majority decision) (Kohler-Koch 1999:20-23). 
However, evaluating the results of several German research projects, Kohler-Koch 
(2002) came subsequently to sober conclusions. Firstly, approval of the policy 
principles that are the base of European policy programmes, such as inclusion of 
social and economic actors and territorial competitiveness policy, does not 
necessarily coincide with the actual observable behaviour. On the contrary, policy 
adaptation and compliance with structural fund regulations takes the form of 
“symbolic change” and “isolated implementation” in “Europeanised” policies 
(Lang 2003). Secondly, even in the case of policy change it cannot even be taken for 
granted that policy principles are transferred from the European level. Policy 
change might as well be the result of a transnational process of policy diffusion or 
developments at a domestic level (Kohler-Koch 2002). Finally, the network 
governance approach has been criticised for not being suited to grasp the relations 
between different levels of policy areas (Benz and Eberlein 1999). The definition of 
“concertation of interests” relates to the interaction of state and non-state actors in 
horizontal governance, in which state actors have a mediating rather than steering 
role. However, this definition can hardly describe forms of vertical governance.   
To sum up, the impact of European policy is less clear-cut and one-directional and 
much more mediated by the domestic arena than established analytical approaches 
have suggested. From a different starting point, the debate on the “Europeanisation” 
of domestic policies came to similar conclusions. The debate started with 
emphasising the differential impact on member states but led to a widely shared 
sceptical view on conceiving the European impact as a causal mechanism for 
domestic change. On the one hand, adaptation pressure as a result of institutional or 
policy “misfit,” although mediated by filters such as the flexibility of domestic 
institutions (Boerzel and Risse 2001), is only in very exceptional cases the driving 
force of domestic change. On the other hand, domestic actors can exploit European 
policies for their own reform-oriented purposes, even if EU and domestic 
arrangements are compatible.  
The discussion of the process of policy diffusion will therefore proceed with a 
detailed analysis of the supply side of (European) policies, that is the opportunity 
structures European regional policy offer, before it will turn to the demand side, the 
constellations of the domestic arena which determine the way domestic actors use 
European policies.  
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OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY  
An analysis of European regional policy highlights the importance of distinguishing 
between vertical governance, that is the relation between the Commission, national 
and subnational authorities, and horizontal governance, that is the relation between 
state authorities and private and public interest groups at the regional and 
subregional level. Whilst in vertical governance the institutional relations the 
Commission promotes are closely related to economic development policies, in 
horizontal governance the institutional relations and administrative practices, which 
are promoted by the Commission, are interrelated. 
VERTICAL GOVERNANCE 
Network governance approaches have analysed how economic policies and a 
concept of participatory institutional relations converged in the conception of 
structural funds. The Commission attempted to spearhead a process of policy 
change in economic development policies that had already started in several 
member states (Ansell 2000). Economic development policies in Western Europe 
demonstrated a paradigm shift from an inward investment orientation towards an 
endogenous (or indigenous) development approach. The goal of the inward 
investment approach is to reduce regional disparities by attracting capital from 
outside the region in order to increase economic growth and employment. In 
contrast, the endogenous development approach aims to strengthen the endogenous 
economic potential and build the institutional capacity to make full use of it. The 
Commission portrayed its economic development policies as reflecting the general 
tendency that   
…policy makers are moving away from their former reliance on subsidies 
for investment and employment and measures are being oriented more 
towards improving competitiveness and the regional business 
environment through business-related infrastructure development 
(notably in the Netherlands), technology transfer and consultancy 
services, especially for marketing and exports. The nature of business 
related infrastructure provision is also changing: the traditional provision 
of industrial estates, factories and local services is being supplemented by 
the creation of enterprise and incubator units, technology and science 
parks and telematic centres (CEC 1994: 136-7). 
Referring to the need for knowledge and involvement in local and regional 
economic development, the Commission emphasised the necessity to involve 
regional and local authorities to increase the efficiency as well as the legitimacy of 
policy-making. The “partnership principle,” as the Commission called it (as aptly as 
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vaguely), was given an institutional frame with the participation of regional 
authorities in the elaboration of Community Support Frameworks (outlining the 
policies for the entire territory of southern Italy and western Germany respectively) 
and in the associated national monitoring committee. The Commission encouraged, 
furthermore, the elaboration of regional operational programmes (along national 
operational programmes for policy areas such as transport) and the delegation of 
responsibility to the relevant regional authorities, which are in many European 
member states regional governments.  
However, the “mode of governance” the Commission promotes can best be 
characterised as “contractualisation.” Negotiations with the Commission itself take 
place within a strong “shadow of hierarchy.” Policy formulation does not occur in 
egalitarian co-operation between the higher and the lower echelons of governance 
(as in German co-operative federalism). Firstly, the Commission sets the framework 
conditions for policy formulation by drafting the Community Support Framework 
(CSF), although on the basis of regional development plans submitted by the 
member state (in cooperation with regional authorities). Secondly, within the 
framework of the CSF the national or regional authorities elaborate national and 
regional operational programmes, but the Commission exerts a significant influence 
by the threat to withhold its approval. The control function of the Commission is 
most obvious with regard to the use of the classic instruments of the inward 
investment approach, investment and wage subsidies. Investment subsidies still 
remain part of the structural funds but they are subject to the limitations set by the 
Commission. Moreover, the Commission announced a stop to any permanent wage 
subsidies. In a similar vein, national governments can use the negotiations for the 
state aid control agreements as well as for Community Support Frameworks to set 
framework conditions for the regional operational programmes. Opportunity 
structures, therefore, encompass the empowerment of regional authorities as well as 
the “hollowing out but hardening” (della Sala 1997) of the central state by using the 
external bounds to stop permanent, unconditional support for lagging regions. The 
delegation of responsibility to the regional authorities as promoted by the 
Commission is based on an endogenous development approach, but goes along with 
an emphasis on “territorial competitiveness policies”. 
HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE 
In horizontal governance, the institutional relations and administrative practices are 
interlinked in the conceptions of the Commission. The emphasis put on the 
integration of the different European structural funds for social policy, agricultural 
policy and regional policy, its link to developmental strategies, and a continuous 
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evaluation open up space for the inclusion of non-state actors in a process of 
deliberation.3 The Commission claims that   
…programming and evaluation […]together have created a policy 
making process with continuous improvement in the measures 
implemented (again the ‘learning organisation’) and which are often 
described as the main innovation to arise from the Funds (CEC 1999:11). 
In terms of administrative practices, “programming” means the integration of policy 
programmes of different ministries and their link to explicit developmental 
strategies. This approach aims at overcoming the divisions between departmental 
responsibilities, and between political decision-making and administrative policy 
programmes. In addition, the use of a comprehensive system of evaluations aims to 
introduce result-oriented administrative practices.  
Both approaches open up the possibility to include non-state actors in the 
deliberation of policy programmes and its surveillance and examination. Since the 
Commission retreated to some extent from participating in decision-making in the 
Monitoring Committees, it provided further technical assistance for private and 
public-interest groups in order to obtain the necessary expertise to evaluate the 
administrative documents. Opportunity structures in this process encompass the 
empowerment of private actors as well as the strengthening of the regional 
executive (and to some extent) the national executive by a tighter control of the 
success of policy measures. 
PRECONDITIONS FOR DOMESTIC RESPONSIVENESS: STRENGTH 
OF INSTITUTIONS AND POSITION OF THE GATE-KEEPER 
In the analysis of the use of European policies in eastern Germany and southern 
Italy, the paper will use a framework that avoids a methodological premise of 
whether the impact of European policies will be empowerment or policy 
transformation. It will use the “actor-centred institutionalist approach” developed 
by Mayntz and Scharpf (1995). This approach uses a narrow definition of 
institutions as formal rules. This definition avoids regarding institutions as 
determining behaviour. Mayntz and Scharpf emphasise that institutions guide the 
behaviour of actors but actors have at the same time the option to change the 
institutions (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995:44). However, institutions are supported by 
informal rules or an institutional culture, which determines the propensity of actors 
                                              
3 Some authors have even claimed that the main function of non-state actors in the monitoring committees is to 
provide information and serve as an “alarm bell” for the Commission (Bauer 2001). 
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to seek for institutional change. Informal rules have been defined by Boerzel as 
“informal understandings about appropriate behaviour within a given formal rule 
structure” (Boerzel 1999:579). Boerzel analysed informal rules as determining 
actor’s behaviour in reaction to changes induced by Europeanisation. However, 
informal rules are not only relevant in cases of external shocks, but the relation 
between the informal rules and the formal rules is one of the moving forces for 
institutional change. This relation determines the propensity of domestic actors to 
use European policies to promote domestic change. It will therefore determine in 
policy areas such as regional policy whether change will occur at all, which leaves 
considerable leeway for domestic actors. The propensity of actors to change 
institutions will differ in various institutional settings according to how strongly 
formal rules are based on entrenched informal rules. This distinction allows us to 
incorporate the phenomenon that “imported” institutional settings determine formal 
rules, but day-to-day-interaction occurs according to well-entrenched informal 
rules. 
The paper will distinguish, according to the different relation between formal and 
informal rules, between uncontested institutions, parallel institutional settings, 
contested institutions and institutional voids. It will argue that domestic actors use 
European policies according to the “robustness” of domestic institutions. 
UNCONTESTED INSTITUTIONS  
In uncontested institutions, informal rules are congruent to formal institutions and 
accepted by all domestic actors. In uncontested institutions, the “logic of 
appropriateness” determines the behaviour of actors. If domestic institutions are 
characterised by strong informal rules, divergent formal rules of European 
structural fund regulations will be implemented in a formal and symbolic way but 
actors’ interaction will be guided by the well-entrenched informal rules. The impact 
of European policies will be limited, as dependent on the domestic institutional 
capacity, to adaptation or inertia. 
PARALLEL INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS 
Uncontested institutions can, however, encompass different institutional frames. In 
this case actors have to decide on the “coupling” of structural funds with domestic 
institutional frames. Actors can be empowered if they “couple” European policies 
with one of the different institutional frames in the domestic context. The impact of 
European policies, though, will be characterised by empowerment of one domestic 
actor whilst policy transfer will be limited. 
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CONTESTED INSTITUTIONS 
In contested institutions, not all domestic actors accept informal norms. Contested 
domestic institutions leave more leeway for interest-oriented strategies of actors. 
Actors, therefore, make selective use of European policies to push for change in 
domestic informal rules. The impact will be a mix of empowerment and policy 
transfer. 
INSTITUTIONAL VOID 
In a process of institutional change that leads to a temporary institutional void, 
European policies are used to foster the entrenchment of new informal rules. 
Comprehensive reforms of domestic policies will rather foster new relations 
between actors than the empowerment of one actor. The willingness to use 
European procedures to establish new institutional relations is the highest in this 
case.  
Whilst the strength of domestic institutions determines the propensity of domestic 
actors to use European policies to promote domestic reforms, the actor who 
occupies the broker position to the European Commission will determine the exact 
thrust of domestic reforms. This actor has been described as the gate-keeper but his 
function might as well be that of a gate-way for European policies. Therefore, two 
further preconditions and factors determine the impact of European policies: the 
institutional capacity of the gate-keeper and the policy convergence between the 
policy preferences of the gate-keeper and European regional polices. In addition, 
institutional capacity and policy convergence will be the decisive factors to obtain 
the position of gate-keeper to the Commission in the first place. Lastly, as the 
following case studies will show, European regional policies offer opportunity 
structures for different domestic reform projects and different combinations of 
policy transfer and empowerment of domestic actors.  
EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICIES IN EASTERN GERMANY 
VERTICAL GOVERNANCE: COMPETING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMES  
German regional policies reflect the characteristics of policy-making in Germany’s 
co-operative or interlocking federalism (Benz 1999, Sturm 2000). German regional 
policies are characterised by the co-existence of   (i) co-operative policy making in 
the “joint task development of regional economic structures” and (ii) exclusively 
regional competences in the other areas of regional policies.  Regional policies are 
therefore related to two sets of institutions that, moreover, incorporate different 
economic development strategies. 
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Although the constitutional assignment of responsibilities in Germany distinguishes 
between national, concurring and regional responsibilities, interlocking 
competencies are the prevalent form of co-operation between the territorial levels. 
German interlocking federalism is based on the assignment of most of the 
administrative tasks to the regional level on the one hand, and the far-reaching 
co-operation of the chamber of the regions in policy-making on the other hand. 
Regional policy, though, goes one step further as it is based on the interaction of the 
national and regional executives in the “joint task development of regional 
economic structures”. 
Regional policies were first introduced at the national level during the grand 
coalition of the Christian democrats and Social democrats (1966 to 1969) which 
together held a two thirds majority to make constitutional amendments. Several 
path-breaking reforms in this period were inspired by Keynesian demand policies 
and aimed at co-ordinating the expenditures of national and regional policies. In 
addition, the competency of the federal government for regional policies (as well as 
for the reform of the university system) was at least debatable. Therefore, 
programmes were conceptualised as “joint tasks” between the regions and the 
federal government in which both contribute 50% of the relevant resources. In 
addition, policy programmes were formulated together but implemented by the 
regions at their discretion. In terms of economic development policies, policy 
programmes followed the inward investment approach and were strictly limited to 
investment subsidies and business-related infrastructure. In the German context it 
was the “export-base” theory, which stated that economic growth is dependent on 
an increase in exports and, therefore, subsidies were limited to companies in the 
relevant economic branches. This institutional arrangement was due to the 
interlocking competencies and was so resistant to substantial change that it was 
described in Scharpf’s seminal work as a “joint-decision-making trap” (Scharpf 
1985). Scharpf pointed out that informal rules went even further than formal rules 
for majority decisions, and demanded unanimity in the negotiations between the 
federal and the Länder governments. As a result, he concluded that responsibilities 
became blurred and, due to the required unanimity among the regional 
governments, changes to the redistributive rules were only possible by increasing 
the resource transfers from the federal level. 
However, during the 1980s Länder governments developed their own regional 
policies that implemented the new instruments of the endogenous development 
approach. At the Länder level the theory of "endogenous development" took hold 
encompassing support for research and technology initiatives, qualification of 
workers, regional infrastructure, environment and housing supply, creating an 
innovative and stimulating climate for economic activity (Benz 1999:18). 
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Regional policies were a part of the policies of the Länder and aimed to raise their 
profile. They have been made possible by the allocation of resources from taxes, 
which are levied by the federal level, to the Länder according to rules established in 
the same period 1966 to 1969. The allocation of resources to the Länder within a 
comprehensive fiscal equalisation mechanism entailed a strongly egalitarian aspect. 
After unification the economically lagging Eastern German Länder were 
incorporated in the equalisation system. As a compensation for their much lower tax 
income, they were granted within the framework of “national solidarity pacts” 
transfers from the western Länder as well as significant additional resources from 
the federal government. On their part, the Länder have been eager to defend their 
own competencies by raising the hurdles for intervention by the federal government 
in the revision of the constitutional law in 1994. 
In the aftermath of German unification, the regional policy of the “joint tasks 
development of regional economic structures” became the core instrument of the 
economic development policies for eastern Germany. The joint tasks were 
substantially increased and became heavily bent towards the east4 (Anderson 1999). 
Investment subsides were regarded as the main instrument to compensate the loss of 
industrial substance as a result of the economic unification of eastern Germany, 
even more so when it became obvious that unification and the subsequent 
exposition of eastern German companies to the more advanced western competition 
led to a dramatic scaling down of eastern German companies and the loss of 
millions of jobs.  
The German government briefly considered renouncing structural fund support in 
exchange for more leeway for national regional policies. Subsequently, the 
Commission and the German government agreed on a simplified programme 
structure to include eastern Germany in the structural funds for 1991 to 1994. In this 
transition period, the federal ministry of economics occupied the position of 
gate-keeper in the relation to the Commission. It channelled the structural funds 
completely into the joint tasks. The ministry pointed to the economic rationale as 
well the lack of administrative capacity of the new regional governments. Despite 
initial dissenting voices in the eastern regions, the Commission agreed with the 
position of the federal government.  
The negotiations for the period of 1994 to 1999, however, brought about hard 
struggles between the Commission, some eastern Länder governments and the 
federal ministry of economics. The Commission regarded the inward investment 
                                              
4 Between 1991 and 2003 the new Länder received 47.215 million Euros and the old Länder received 5.181 million 
Euros out of the joint tasks development of regional economic structures 
(http://www.bafa.de/1/de/aufgaben/wirtschaft/gemeinschaftsaufgabe.htm [accessed 21.03.2005]). 
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policy of the joint tasks as outdated. It refused to finance any more greenfield estates 
in business-related infrastructure and insisted on a stronger emphasis on SMEs.  In 
addition, Saxony in particular and its minister-president Kurt Biedenkopf, a 
long-time adversary of chancellor Helmut Kohl in German politics, addressed the 
Commission directly and pushed for the opportunity to use structural funds outside 
the joint tasks. The eastern German Länder wanted to use European funds for their 
own regional policies targeting “indigenous” small and medium enterprises, as well 
as for environmental policies and basic infrastructure such as trunk roads. As a 
result, the joint tasks were to some extent modified to encompass some of the 
endogenous development policies, in particular to include investment subsidies for 
SMEs. In addition, a flexibility clause allowed the eastern German Länder to use the 
funds for other purposes, which complied with the very wide definition of 
development policies by the Commission. One salient example of environmental 
policies is the restoration of areas that have been damaged by the Russian military, 
in particular in the region of Brandenburg.  
Subsequently, the role of the federal government in the negotiations for the period 
2000 to 2006 was very limited. The German proposal for the Community Support 
Framework was a compilation of the regional development plans, which the 
ministry of economics had even outsourced to a consultancy agency. All eastern 
German regions used European funds outside of the joint tasks to a much higher 
degree as in the preceding period 1994 to 1999. Subsequently, the German 
government openly favoured, in the negotiations of the future of structural funds, a 
re-nationalisation of regional policies. In contrast, the eastern German Länder 
rejected its offers to be compensated by national regional policies. They wanted to 
maintain their discretion of policy formulation as well as the security of the 
European 7 year programmes which are not subject to domestic insecurity. 
Vertical governance in Germany demonstrated the logic that multi-level 
governance approaches are evoking: i.e. the pressure from below (the regional 
level) and from above (the European level) led to an empowerment of the regions. 
The regions could replace the federal ministry of economics as the gate-keeper to 
the Commission as they were to decide on the use of European funds in one of the 
competing institutional frameworks. In contrast, the federal ministries developed an 
animosity against European regional policies. A top civil-servant of the federal 
ministry of economics portrayed the relation between the two sets of regional 
policies as a zero-sum game and the Commission’s strategy as “double attack”: 
 (S)ince the mid 1970s the Commission pursues the strategic aim to push 
member states to the sideline in the area of regional policies. It does so by 
following a double strategy. By tightening up state-aid control it 
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constrains the options for German regional policy step by step. At the 
same time it extends its own competencies in the area of EU structural 
policy. By doing so it fills the policy gap it has created by its state aid 
control policy in the first place (Tetsch 1999:373). 
However, eastern German regions were not willing to accept European state aid 
control, as investment subsidies still play a prominent role next to policies for 
“endogenous development”. The often cited controversy about investment 
subsidies for the VW plants in the region of Saxony demonstrated a serious clash 
between the Commission on the one hand and the German federal and regional 
government on the other hand. Eastern German Länder had been empowered in 
their relation to the federal government but the policy change was limited.5 
Informal rules did not allow the national government to adopt a proactive stance in 
negotiations with the Commission in the context of the contractualisation-approach 
and to “invade” the areas of Länder regional policies.6 Moreover, no informal rule 
existed that would have demanded a similar compensation of the national 
government for the empowerment of the regional governments as was the case in 
the opposite effect of European integration (Boerzel 2000).  
HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE: UNCONTESTED INSTITUTIONS 
The co-operation of the Länder governments with the Commission, in opposition to 
the national level in the negotiation of the CSF, did not lead them to regard the 
policies of the Commission on the regional level with similar approval. On the 
contrary, at the regional level European policies met uncontested and 
well-entrenched institutions. As a heritage of the late state-building process in 
Germany, most administrative functions are historically delegated to regional and 
local authorities. In addition, the German administrative tradition is based on a strict 
division between public and private actors.  Civil servants demonstrate a 
co-operative attitude towards private actors, however, they are held responsible to 
the state and not the public. Therefore civil servants have a formalistic and legalistic 
approach to policy implementation, which is clearly separated from the political 
decision-making process. In addition, policy-making is strongly sectoralised by the 
responsibilities of different ministries which interact mainly in “negative 
co-ordination”, that is, in case of tension between policies (Knill 2002:68-70). This 
                                              
5 Conzelmann (2002) himself revised an earlier opposite assessment of the controversy as a process of “policy 
learning” (in Conzelmann 1998). 
6 Only very recently the federal government attempted to achieve a say in the spending of resources within the 
framework of the domestic solidarity pact until 2019, which was negotiated in 2003 and encompassed resource 
transfers of 160 billion Euros. The Länder rejected the demands of the federal government point-blank. 
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character of German administration has rather been enforced in eastern Germany by 
the state-socialist legacy. 
In addition, even western Länder governments themselves have been analysed as 
lacking institutionalised co-operation with non-state actors. The German 
policy-making style has often been described as corporatist (Schmidt 1997). 
However, corporatist arrangements exist at the federal level, in particular in social 
policies, but are hard to find at a regional level. If there is a consultation of trade 
unions and employer organisations in the process of policy-making, it is rather 
based on personal contacts. Organised social and economic interest actors are at the 
margins of communication “networks” (Knodt 1998).  
Accordingly, the Commission’s suggestions and demands to include public and 
private actors into the monitoring committees and to provide them with technical 
assistance to obtain additional expertise were only reluctantly accepted and put into 
practice. Whereas regional and federal government could prevent the obligatory 
participation of non-state actors in the monitoring committees in the CSF for the 
period 1994 to 1999, it took several pointed letters from the commissioner for 
regional policies, Monika Wulf-Mathies, to the minister-presidents of regional 
governments to urge the Länder governments to include non-state actors in the 
monitoring committees at the Länder level. Despite a higher degree of compliance 
in the preparation of the operational programmes for 2000 to 2006, an examination 
of the “programming” process in Saxony, for instance, concludes that “the 
interaction has to be characterised as one-way-street” (Eckstein 2001:323). 
Social and economic partners on their part do only rarely participate actively in the 
deliberation of regional policies. As one representative in the region of 
Mecklenburg West Pomerania, which still stands out in the quality of the 
negotiations in the Monitoring Committees, put it: “Speaking alone to the ministries 
is more efficient.” Social and economic partners are in general more interested in 
information about access to funding in areas such as vocational (re-)training where 
both trade unions and employer organisations have interests at stake. Emblematic 
was the negative attitude of social and economic partners in several regions towards 
the Commission’s suggestion to get a vote in the Monitoring Committees as they 
rejected “to be held responsible” for the implementation of European funds.  
In addition, the administration regards the integration of programmes as well as 
their evaluation as neither necessary nor compatible with the German administrative 
system. German regions are given in the reports of the Commission as laggards in 
the elaboration of regional development strategies and plans. Evaluation is regarded 
with utmost suspicion by all levels of government in Germany. Even the failure of 
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numerous large investment projects did not change the conviction held by all levels 
of German administration that evaluations are not capable of measuring and 
comparing the effectiveness of policy implementation. In addition, the dependence 
of evaluators on the commissions from the administration is emphasised.7 As a 
result, structural funds are integrated in the ordinary administrative programmes 
with hardly any link between different programmes. 
To conclude, eastern German Länder had to comply with structural funds 
arrangements, but informal rules dominate the policy-making process. The 
integration of funds can only be found in the official reports and possibly as 
side-effects of the different departmental policies; evaluations are not accepted as 
an instrument to increase the quality of policy implementation. Monitoring 
committees rather serve as communication channels and testing ground for regional 
governments and administrations. Although regional administrations had to adapt to 
the formal rules of structural fund regulations and had the institutional capacity to 
do so, policy making follows informal rules based on the well entrenched 
policy-making style and administrative tradition. 
REGIONAL POLICIES IN SOUTHERN ITALY  
In contrast to the stable institutional environment of German regional policies, at the 
inception of European regional policies, institutional relations as well as economic 
development policies were increasingly contested in southern Italy. Regions were 
established in Italy in the first half of the 1970s, albeit with very limited 
competencies, and Italy had become a “decentralised unitary state.” However, the 
territorial structure of state organisation in Italy had been subject to controversy and 
political struggle since the end of the Second World War. In fact, the constitution 
had already prescribed the establishment of regions, but the governing Christian 
democrats feared (at that time) the domination of central Italian regions by the 
communist opposition. Therefore, the implementation of regional structures was 
limited to the granting of special statutes to Sicily, Sardegna, Trentino Alto-Adige 
and Venetia-Giulia. With the establishment of the regions, a slow process of 
decentralisation started. The transfer of resources was very limited and often 
connected to circumscribed purposes, in particular for (local) health services.  
In addition, these changes hardly effected the organisation of regional development 
policies in the south. The policies for the south were based since the 1950s on the 
“special intervention” by the Cassa per il mezzogiorno and a strong role of the 
state-owned holdings in economic development policies. In the post-war years the 
                                              
7 Officials of the ministry for economics caution against the emergence of an “evaluation mafia”. 
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Cassa per il mezzogiorno was explicitly designed to circumvent the inefficient 
administration in the south. The Cassa as well as state holdings were founded as 
independent agencies and companies led by independent top personnel with a high 
degree of professionalism. This seemed to be a successful formula for economic 
development in the1950s and 1960s (Locke 1995). In fact, the gap between northern 
and southern Italy decreased and the living conditions in Italy improved 
considerably.  The economic strategy of the Cassa had followed an 
inward-investment strategy that neglected any embeddedness in local and regional 
economies.  State holdings were obliged to allocate up to 60% of their investment in 
the south (Locke 1995). As a result, numerous infamous examples of “cathedrals in 
the desert” emerged. In the 1980s the gap was visibly widening again and the 
negative effect on the endogenous potential of the south became obvious. Industrial 
districts, the landmark of the late development in central and northeast Italy, had 
virtually disappeared. In addition, the Cassa and the state holdings had become 
subject to political influence and interference and degenerated into resources for 
clientelist competition.  
Widespread dissatisfaction concerned the institutional model and the economic 
development strategies. Despite a growing transfer of resources (although from a 
very low level), subnational authorities did not have to bear any responsibility to 
account for its use. Some attempts, in particular in 1976 and 1986, were made to 
give regional governments more of a say in regional policies and to remedy the 
strong investment orientation of the policies for the south by introducing measures 
for small and medium enterprises. 
In the first period of structural funds from 1988 to 1993, the Commission tried to 
establish links to the regional governments and deal with them as policy brokers. 
Half of the resources of the structural funds were assigned to the regional 
governments and provided them with the first significant role in economic 
development policies. On its part, the central government for the first time feared 
being bypassed. The minister responsible for co-ordination of Community policies 
criticised that   
…the Commission […] insists on an unacceptable tendency to take 
initiatives directly involving regions, a procedure, which while it might 
appear faster, unbalances the contractual relationships and so in practice 
gives the Commission more freedom of manoeuvre and choice (cited in 
Desideri 1995:79). 
However, regional governments (with the exception of Basilicata) had neither the 
institutional capacity nor the same policy preferences as the Commission. Regional 
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governments were still focused on providing visible benefits to the largest number 
of voters by using traditional policy instruments, in particular the building of basic 
infrastructure. Structural fund implementation added another chapter in 
administrative failure and in Italy’s notoriously bad implementation record of 
European policies. The second period from 1994 to 1999 had to spend the 
considerable leftovers of resources from the first period, 1988 to 1993, which 
regional governments had simply not been able to spend according to the more 
demanding European regulations. Some reorganisation of the bureaucratic 
coordination of structural fund implementation took place. In particular, the 
establishment of the cabina di regia improved the bad implementation record but at 
the expense of relying again on traditional programmes such as infrastructure and 
investment subsidies (LaSpina 2003). In addition, regional governments tended to 
spend money on national programmes or the resources were reallocated to national 
programmes to prevent them from being forfeited. Empowerment and policy 
transfer to regional government was limited by their lack of institutional capacity 
and the lack of policy convergence.  
The economic and political crisis in Italian policies culminated in 1992 when Italy 
was forced to leave the European Monetary system due to its exorbitant inflation 
and budget deficit. At the same time, the tangentopoli scandal in Milano and the 
assassination of high profile judges in southern Italy by the mafia discredited the 
parties which had governed Italy since the end of the Second World War. This crisis 
led to the breakdown of the established party system and the disappearance of all 
five governing parties. In the course of the Italian transition, both the national 
ministry for state participation and the Cassa per il mezzogiorno, as symbols for 
clientelism and the waste of public resources, were abolished under the pressure of 
public referenda which threatened to do exactly that. As a result, this form of 
“parallel administration” (Baldi 2000) was abolished. In the aftermath of the 1992 
crisis, European polices were used by transitory governments to dismantle the 
remnants of the old policy for the south. The pressure of the Commission to limit the 
debts of the largest state holding IRI fostered the privatisation of the state-holdings. 
This influenced the Ciampi government to complete the removal of juridical 
obstacles to privatisation (OECD 1995:68). Another salient case of the use of the 
European leverage was the swift ending of wage subsidies (by the tax deductibility 
of social contributions) in the south, which had lowered the wage costs by up to 
20%. Although the Commission put pressure on Italy in this question, Pagliarini, the 
minister of the Northern League in the first Berlusconi government, used the 
negotiation in 1994 to end this support for the south much swifter than the 
Commission would have insisted on (and the phasing out was subsequently 
renegotiated by the following government) (Viesti 2003; Barca 2001). During this 
period European state aid control, the “stick” in European regional polices, 
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empowered the national government to limit and terminate “unconditional support” 
for the south by wage subsidies and public enterprises.  
Only with the election of a centre-left government after several transitory 
governments, mainly of technocrats, a reorganisation of regional policies in Italy 
took place. In this situation with the Department for development and cohesion 
policies (DPS, Dipartimento per le politiche di sviluppo e coesione), a new actor 
emerged as policy broker and gate-keeper to the Commission. The DPS was 
designed as an administrative unit with a high degree of independence. It was 
assigned the function to lead the process of negotiation between the central state and 
the regions over planning agreements, and to negotiate them with the Commission. 
The DPS subsequently played a pivotal role in the reform of Italian regional policies 
at a time when the dismantling of the old policies for the south had left a 
considerable institutional void. Public investment had plummeted and the ordinary 
administration had to take over the responsibilities of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. 
The DPS used structural funds to promote a new mode of governance that combined 
the delegation of responsibility with increased control of the principles of policy 
formulation and a tight control of policy implementation by the central state. 
Institutional arrangements elaborated by the DPS have been characterised as 
“neo-centralisation” (Gualini 2001) or as a U-turn from “excessive 
decentralisation” (Piattoni 2003). The DPS had a similar conception of a 
contractualisation of the relations between the central and the regional governments 
as the Commission. The regions did not universally welcome the increased control 
this approach brought about; in particular Sicily and Sardinia with its special status 
resented the interference of the national government.  
In the relation between the central government and the regional governments, the 
latter were allocated more than 70% of the resources in the period 2000 to 2006.8 
However, the Community Support Framework provided a much stricter framework 
than in the previous periods. The developmental strategy of the DPS was explicitly 
based on the growth theories by Krugmann (1991), which focus on the external 
effects of agglomerations as the main factor for regional competitiveness. The CSF, 
therefore, limited investment subsidies and infrastructure works on the one hand, 
and assigned considerable resources to subregional programmes and territorial 
pacts on the other hand. Symptomatic was the disappearing of the axis “industry, 
craftship and services for enterprises” which was absorbed in the axis “local 
system.” The head of the DPS, a well-known economist, pointed out: 
                                              
8 In fact, including the reward reserve, a premium for the best performing regional programmes, the regional quota 
is near 80%. 
IJIS Volume 3
 JOERG BAUDNER– DOMESTIC USE OF EUROPEAN POLICIES 
 
89  
Despite strong pressure from the conservative Italian confederation of 
Industrialists, incentives for businesses have been drastically reduced. A 
larger share of resources is thus left to finance projects proposed by local 
infrastructures and training and research facilities. Territorial pacts 
inside clusters therefore have a relevant role to play (Barca 2000:106). 
HORIZONTAL GOVERNANCE 
At the regional level also, substantial institutional gaps if not institutional voids 
emerged. First, a considerable part of administrative functions had been for decades 
assigned to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Second, the relations between regions and 
local authorities were at best contradictory, if not tense. Traditionally, it had rather 
been local authorities that had taken over (however rudimentary in the south) 
functions in economic development policies. 
The DPS engaged in an institution-building process in administrative practices and 
a large-scale experiment in new forms of territorial governance. Following up 
administrative reforms of the so-called Bassanini laws of 1998 that delegated a 
large part of the administration to the subnational level, the DPS attempted to 
diffuse a result-oriented administrative culture. Regional administrations were 
provided with evaluation units (“nuclei di evaluazione”) to strengthen the regional 
executive and tighten control of policy implementation. However, this did not 
coincide directly with the inclusion of non-state actors in the policy-making 
process. Private and public interest groups are weakly organised at the regional 
level in Italy. Instead of bringing non-state actors in, the DPS used another 
instrument the Commission had devised in the 2000-2006 period: the reward 
reserve. The reward reserve is allocated conditionally on the fulfilling of 
implementation criteria; a part of it is allocated only to the most successful 
programmes. In contrast to other member states such as Germany who strongly 
resented the introduction of the reward reserve, Italy added another 6% reserve to 
benefit the building of institutional capacity.  
On a subregional level, territorial pacts and territorially integrated programmes 
constituted a new form and a new level of territorial governance. Territorial pacts 
were developed in the Italian context at the same time (starting in 1996) when the 
Commission promoted Territorial employment pacts. Both were designed to 
encourage economic entities encompassing one or several provinces to elaborate 
common agreements for development projects with all relevant public and 
non-public actors. These should include commitments by the administration, 
employer organisation and trade unions to increase efficiency and flexibility in their 
co-operation. Accordingly, the resources spent on territorial pacts have been 
described as the “public incentive for local communities, which want to change the 
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rules of the game and of territorial governance” (Cersosimo and Wolleb 2001: 
221-222; cf. Trigilia 2001). The EU-supported pacts turned out to become the 
example of “best practice” in the Italian debate. They provided more resources in 
particular to employ technical staff, and established at the same time stricter 
regulations for the commitments of all participating actors (Cersosimo and Wolleb 
2001). Territorially integrated programmes, which followed the same scheme, 
became an important part in the period 2000 to 2006, encompassing around 20% of 
the regional expenditures. 
The aim of this new form of governance is evidently to replace the informal rules of 
co-operation in the common practice of dividing the spoils, and to encourage 
deliberative processes aiming at producing public goods. Territorial pacts and 
territorially integrated programmes became a large-scale experiment in “new modes 
of horizontal governance.” This attempt still has to be evaluated in detail, and 
differences within the regions have to be analysed. The conception of evaluation 
units in all regional governments is an example that demonstrates that the new 
concepts and ideas in administrative practices had been developed in the domestic 
context (as early as in the failed reforms of 1981). However, European policies 
provided some innovative procedures and the external bounds to enforce new rules. 
European policies conferred the approach of the DPS, in the words of Fabrizio 
Barca, “credibility and legitimacy.”9  
With the period 2000 to 2006, the responsibility for territorial integrated 
programmes and territorial pacts was handed over to the regions. The relation 
between the regions and territorial pacts became a new level of vertical governance. 
The regions were assigned a similar function for these pacts as the central 
government to the regions, that is to set framework conditions and evaluate and 
monitor the results. The DPS attempted to diffuse this new mode of governance in 
the relation between the central government and the regional governments, and 
encouraged regional governments to establish the same relationship between 
regional governments and subregional territorial pacts and territorially projects and 
pacts. 
Whereas the DPS demonstrated a high degree of policy convergence and the 
institutional capacity to promote the reforms in vertical governance at a regional 
and subregional level, it is rather dependent on the institutional capacity and the 
policy convergence of regional and local actors whether these reforms will be a 
period of policy innovation or transformation. However, the institutional void and 
the emergence of a new policy broker led to the use of European policies to reform 
administrative practices and institutional relations. In the Italian case, it concerned 
                                              
9 Personal interview in September 2003. 
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the relations between regional and subregional entities as well as within these 
subregional entities. 
CONCLUSION 
The case studies have demonstrated considerable differences in the use of European 
policies. In Germany’s co-operative federalism, the Länder in eastern Germany 
have been empowered as they replaced the federal ministry of economics in the 
position of gate-keeper to the Commission. They are to decide as to which of the 
competing domestic institutional frames they use European funds, either within the 
co-operative policy-making in the joint tasks or within their own regional policies 
of the Länder. This process of empowerment came close to the mechanism 
multi-level governance approaches have evoked: the coalition of pressure from 
below and from above on national policies. In contrast, no informal rules existed in 
Germany that would have allowed the federal government to use the 
contractualisation in European programmes to “invade” the regional policies of the 
Länder. In fact, even the demands of the federal government to have its say in the 
spending of the resources, which the solidarity pact transferred to the eastern 
Länder, have been point-blank refused by the eastern Länder.  
In addition, European policies led only to limited policy change, as the eastern 
regions were not willing to accept European limitation on the inward-investment 
policies. Furthermore, as uncontested institutions existed at the regional level both 
with regard to the process of policymaking and in terms of administrative practices, 
informal rules dominated policy-making in the area of “Europeanised” policies. 
Vertical governance in Italy was, from the inception of European regional policies, 
based on contested institutions. Centralised policy-making in vertical governance 
and a strong investment-orientation in economic development policies were 
executed by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno and the state-owned holdings. Regional 
governments were not able to use in this situation the position as gate-keeper due to 
a lack of institutional capacity and policy convergence. Subsequently, in the 
aftermath of the Italian political and economic crisis in 1992, the national 
government was empowered by the use of European policies to enforce the ending 
of inward investment policies. It was only in the resulting situation of an 
institutional void that the position as gate-keeper was assigned to the newly 
established DPS in Italy. The DPS used European policies to push for the diffusion 
of a new mode of governance and strongly endogenous-development oriented 
economic policies. A new mode of governance is rather characterised by 
contractualisation in vertical governance and deliberation in horizontal governance 
on a subregional level. In addition, the conceptions have been developed in the 
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domestic context but European policies provided the detailed procedures and the 
“external bounds” to put them into practice. 
Do European policies foster or even lead to a convergence of development paths in 
regional policies? There is a common tendency in Western Europe towards the 
adoption of the endogenous development approach and the establishment of some 
form of regional authorities. However, these developments are clearly the result of 
domestic economic and political changes and differences remain considerable. 
Despite increasing criticism, Germany and in particular eastern Germany still hold a 
strong inward-investment orientation in addition to endogenous development 
policies. Somehow ironically, the strong position of the regions in the German 
co-operative policy-making, which exceeds the degree of decision-making power in 
the Commission’s contractualisation approach, has further been strengthened. 
However, given the increasingly contested poor results in eastern Germany, 
co-operative federalism might turn from strength to weakness in the German 
domestic context. 
As far as horizontal governance is concerned, a tendency toward result-oriented 
administrative practices can often be found, but is far from universal. As 
demonstrated, German administrative tradition shows considerable resistance. Even 
more so, policy-making in networks remains a vision. Moreover, it is debatable 
whether the regional level is the appropriate territorial dimension to develop a dense 
net of actors for the direct co-operation in economic development projects, when 
“economic regions” are usually much smaller (McAllevy and de Rynck 1997). 
Subregional territorial pacts in Italy are an interesting policy experiment in this 
respect; it still has to be fully evaluated. 
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